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The present paper has attempted to provide an empirically argumented basis on 
the existing conflict about effectiveness of IT regime on lowering inflation and 
inflation volatility. In the first part we perform panel analysis on a group of 43 
emerging and developing economies for a more recent period ranging from 
1997 to 2011, distinguishing between normal and crisis times as well as 
between geographical regions. Differently from common studies we applied 
dynamic panel model specification that controls for reverse causality of regime 
adoption. Despite broad arguments addresing IT ineffectiveness, our results 
support the regime and imply that shifting to IT will lower both inflation and 
inflation volatility in normal times. Model specification during the external 
shocks was inconclusive on the selected sample with relatively recent IT 
history. Regarding the geographical IT performance, we outlined that regime 
effectiveness was uniform along analyzed regions. In the second part we 
perform a preliminary analysis of a developing economy IT experience and 
conclude that, even though there are some problems of technical nature and 
main policy rate is still a weak instrument of transmission channel, the Republic 
of Moldova chose right time for regime adoption and has made considerable 
progress towards the successful framework implementation. 
JEL Classification: E31, E42, E52, E58. 
Keywords: Inflation targeting, dynamic panel, monetary 
transmission, VAR. 
 
Author’s e-mail: talasimova_ira@yahoo.com 








List of Figures: ............................................................................................................. vii 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................... viii 
Acronyms ........................................................................................................................ ix 
Master Thesis Proposal ............................................................................................... x 
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 
PART I: ............................................................................................................................... 4 
Inflation Targeting in Emerging and Developing Economies ........................ 4 
CHAPTER 1 ....................................................................................................................... 4 
Inflation Targeting in Practice .................................................................................. 4 
1.1 Some Thoughts on Inflation Targeting Background......................................... 4 
1.2 IT Experience Before the Crisis ................................................................................ 6 
1.3 Tackling the Crisis ........................................................................................................10 
CHAPTER 2 .................................................................................................................... 14 
The Analytical Framework ..................................................................................... 14 
2.1 Sample Selection and Preliminary Data Analysis ............................................14 
2.2 Model Specification .....................................................................................................16 
2.3 Empirical Findings .......................................................................................................22 
CHAPTER 3 .................................................................................................................... 30 
Conclusions................................................................................................................... 30 
PART II ........................................................................................................................... 33 
Case Study on the Developing Economy: Inflation Targeting Preliminary 
Experience of the Republic of Moldova. ............................................................. 33 
CHAPTER 4 .................................................................................................................... 33 
Inflation Targeting in Moldova .............................................................................. 33 
4.1 Emerging of IT in Some Developing Economies ..............................................33 
4.2 Issues on IT adoption in Moldova ..........................................................................35 





CHAPTER 5 .................................................................................................................... 42 
Analysis of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism of the Moldavian 
Economy ........................................................................................................................ 42 
5.1 Theoretical Approach to Monetary Policy Transmission .............................42 
5.2 Data Selection ................................................................................................................45 
5.3 Model Specification .....................................................................................................47 
5.4 Estimation Results .......................................................................................................49 
CHAPTER 6 .................................................................................................................... 55 
Concluding Remarks and Recommendations .................................................. 55 
Bibliography................................................................................................................. 58 
Appendix A .................................................................................................................... 63 







List of Figures: 
Figure 1.1: Inflation targeting countries by year of adoption   5 
Figure 2.1: Average inflation for the selected sample     15 
Figure 4.1: The NBM and benchmark frameworks     39 
Figure 5.1: Estimated impulse response functions to monetary policy shock  50 
Figure 5.2: Estimated impulse response functions to RRR shock   52 
Figure 5.3: Forecast error variance decomposition of prices    53 
Figure 5.4: Forecast error variance decomposition of prices (SVAR)   54 
Figure A.1: Inflation evolution by country      65 
Figure A.2: Inflation Volatility for the Selected Sample     67 
Figure B.1: Plot of selected variables       72 
Figure B.2: VAR impulse responses to unexpected ER depreciation  75 





List of Tables 
Table 2.1: Estimates of IT on Inflation and Inflation Volatility    23 
Table 2.2: Estimates of Inflation Targeting on Inflation in Different Regions of 
the World          28 
Table 5.1: Johansen trace test for cointegration      47 
Table A.1: Sample of countries delimited by region and IT framework  63 
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics of the variables      65 
Table A.3: Means and Standard Deviations of the analysed sample   66 
Table A.4: Estimates of Inflation Targeting on Inflation and Inflation Volatility 
during the crisis period         68 
Table A.5: Robustness check. Sensitivity to different subsamples   69 
Table A.6: GMM estimators for crisis period with both IT and IT*crisis  70 
Table A.7: Robustness Check. Estimates of Inflation Targeting on Inflation 
Volatility           71 
Table B.1: Information Criteria on number of lags included in the model  73 
Table B.2: VAR stability condition check       73 







AR  Autoregression Model 
CEE  Central and Eastern Europe 
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States 
CPI  Consumer Price Index 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
IRF  Impulse Response Functions 
IT  Inflation Targeting 
MA  Moving Average 
NBM  National Bank of Moldova 
NIT  Non Inflation Targeting 
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OLS  Ordinary Least Squares 
PLT  Price Level Targeting 
SVAR  Structural Vector Autoregression Model 
UNECE  United Nations Commission for Europe 





Master Thesis Proposal 
Institute of Economic Studies 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
Charles University in Prague 
Author:   Irina Talasimova Supervisor: doc. Mgr. Tomáš Holub 
Ph.D. 
E-mail: talasimova_ira@yahoo.com E-mail: tomas.holub@cnb.cz 
Phone: (+420)777085810 Phone:  
Specializa-
tion: 




Inflation Targeting Performance in Emerging Economies and Some Lessons for 
Moldova. 
Topic Characteristics: 
Inflation Targeting (IT) is a relatively new monetary policy framework firstly adopted 
by New Zealand in 1989, which has nowadays a rising market share among other 
monetary policy regimes. It is mainly about setting monetary policy conditions such 
that inflation projections that follow from the last meet inflation target at an 
appropriate horizon. 
Inflation Targeting efectiveness is nowadays viewed partly controversially. Some 
economists find no significant evidence of lowering inflation (Ball and Sheridan) while 
others state its significance on price stability, especially in emerging economies (Wu, 
Cabral). More recent stream of literature focused mainly on after-crisis period suggest 
that IT has helped to avoid deflationary pressure and to achieve faster recovery 
(Carvalho Filho). Furthermore there is evidence that IT influence on lowering inflation 
varies even within emerging countries (Baxa, Plasil, Vasicek). 
Taking in cosideration the existing opinions about the IT, we would like to investigate 
the 15 year performance of this monetary policy regime in emerging and developing 
markets in order to come up with our own conclusions and explanations and compare 
the final results with the existing studies. One important point is that we will account 
for a vigorously discussed reverse causality of the regime adoption. In addition, the 
performance within the target group of IT countries will be examined depending on 
their geographical position. Moreover, we intend to investigate IT experience of the 
Republic of Moldova, a developing economy, which experiences the above mentioned 
regime from 2010. We plan to analyse its readiness for IT regime, i.e the matching of 
the neccesary preconditions and possible future developments as well as monetary 
policy transmission mechanism of the National Bank of Moldova. We think it will be 
useful to develop some policy recommendations in order to further succesfully 
implement and adapt the regime to country specific situation.  
In my opinion the topic is relevant due to the fact that there is limited literature 
focusing on IT accomplishments before and after the recent crisis and the one that 
exists has ambiguous conclusions. In addition, the analysis of a developing country 
preconditions and initial performance can be useful for other economies in transition 






1. IT countries have experienced lower inflation and inflation volatility after 
adopting the new regime. Does this hold in both pre-crisis and crisis periods? 
2. CEE countries have a better performance of IT. Does IT performance depend on 
geographical position of a country?  
3. Suitability of the Republic of Moldova for framework implementation. Does RM 
choose the right time for IT adoption meeting all the necessary preconditions?  
Methodology: 
We intend to use dynamic panel estimation which will account for potential 
endogeneity of the regime adoption proposed by Brito and Bystedt (2008) controlling 
for regression in mean and high inflation. The model is applied on a panel data of 
emerging and developing economies consisting of both IT and NIT countries with 
country and time fixed effects with a dummy variable, indicating whether the country is 
currently an inflation targeter. The two-step system GMM estimator compares the 
average change in the inflation rate for the countries in the treatment group (the official 
adoption of the IT regime) relative to the average change in the inflation rate in the 
control group (other monetary policy regimes) over the same time.  
The treatment effects of IT on inflation (CPI) is defined as the annual growth rate of CPI, 
and on inflation variability, defined as the standard deviation of a three-year moving 
average of detrended series of inflation.  





2. Literature review 
3. IT regime in EMEs 
4. Empirical estimation of IT performance in EME 
5. Case study on Republic of Moldova IT fresh experience. Analysis of the 
preconditions 
6. Policy recommendations 
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Being a relatively new monetary policy framework, firstly adopted by New 
Zealand in 1989, inflation targeting (IT hereafter) represented a completely 
novel look at monetary policy being mainly about setting monetary policy 
conditions such that inflation projections that follow from the last meet inflation 
target at an appropriate horizon. Basically, it is a forward looking regime which 
is based on targeting inflation expectations rather than inflation per se.  
Its formal objective of price stability is achieved through a commitment 
to stick to a specific level of inflation stated publicly, implemented and 
maintained with the help of three pillars of a modern central bank: 
independence, transparency and accountability. In more detail, independence 
pillar has a role of preventing inflation surprises enforced by governments, 
accountability stands for preventing deflationary shocks by the central bank as 
well as for making up for the democratic deficit of an independent institution 
and transparency increases efficiency of transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy via managing expectations. 
Starting from its apparition, IT effectiveness has always been seen 
controversially in the literature. Some economists find no robust evidence of 
lowering inflation while others state its significance on price stability, especially 
in emerging economies. In addition, the recent financial crisis has urged IT 
opponents by reconsidering the problem of financial stability and too narrow 
focus of the framework. Even so, regime proponents suggest that it can help to 
avoid deflationary pressure and to achieve faster recovery (Caralho Filho, 
2011). Furthermore there is evidence that IT influence on lowering inflation 
varies even within emerging countries (Baxa, Plasil and Vasicek, 2012). For the 
reasons discussed above and because of a continuously growing number of 
emerging and developing economies, that have adopted the regime or aspire to 
do so in the near future, we decided to make our own analysis which will 
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account for potential weaknesses of the previous works. Furthermore, in the 
present paper we will try to find answers to the next questions: 
1. EME inflation targeters have experienced lower inflation and inflation 
volatility after adopting the regime. Does this hold in both pre-crisis 
and crisis periods? 
2. CEE countries have a better performance of IT. Does IT performance 
depend on geographical position of a country?  
3. Suitability of the Republic of Moldova for framework implementation. 
Does RM choose the right time for IT adoption meeting all the 
necessary preconditions?  
The present study will focus on emerging as well as developing low-income 
countries as it offers a greater heterogeneity and larger spectrum of analysis, 
although some references and analogies will be drawn from the advanced 
economies experience. To our best knowledge, a relatively limited literature is 
developed and focused on IT in low-income countries, which in addition 
analyzes the first realizations of the regime of a developing economy.  
Our main goal is to fill the gap in the current debate on IT effectiveness 
focusing especially on developing economies and trying to assess if the recent 
crisis has induced any modifications. We also want to empirically document 
whether there is any difference in regime performance in several parts of the 
world, and if geographical position mattered for fulfilling the IT goal. Unlike all 
major papers we account for endogeneity of IT adoption discussed by Gertler 
(2005), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2006) and others by applying the 
dynamic panel estimation proposed by Brito and Bystedt (2008) on our sample 
of 43 countries within a more recent time span, which excludes the early 90’s 
period of hyperinflation that may bias the results in favour of the IT regime. The 
employed model relies on two-step system General Method of Moments that is 
developed to capture the main critique of reverse causality of the regime 
adoption and provides unbiased and more efficient parameter estimations.  
Additionally we perform a preliminary analysis of a Republic of Moldova 
experience with the IT regime. Being a relatively new regime for the country 
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one might argue that it is premature to elaborate on its effectiveness on 
anchoring inflation expectations and lowering inflation. Nevertheless we believe 
it is useful to make an analysis of framework compatibility with stylized 
preconditions for IT adoption as well as to assess regime’s first realizations and 
evaluate current state of functioning of monetary transmission mechanism, 
which besides the National Bank of Moldova itself may be useful for other 
countries with similar environment aiming towards the regime adoption and 
facing the same challenges. 
The thesis is structured as follows. Part I discusses the IT regime in 
emerging and developing economies. In Chapter 1 we elaborate on the inflation 
targeting regime emergence and summarize the most relevant empirical 
literature focused on IT framework effectiveness delimiting between pre and 
post crisis view on the regime. We are also trying to assess whether the “state of 
the art“ regime survived the recent economic turndown. Chapter 2 introduces 
the econometric model proposed by us for hypothesis testing and summarizes 
our main findings regarding IT impact on inflation and inflation volatility in 
both “normal” and crisis times. Additionally, we evaluate whether there are any 
regional differences in inflation targeting performance among different parts of 
the world. Chapter 3 outlines our main conclusions for the first part of the 
paper. Further, Part II is dedicated to a case study on the readiness of the 
Republic of Moldova for the regime. Chapter 4 concentrates on fulfilment by the 
National Bank of Moldova (NBM) of the necessary preconditions for IT adoption. 
Chapter 5 provides insights on the NBM monetary policy transmission 
mechanism analysis. Finally, Chapter 6 outlines our main findings and develops 











Inflation Targeting in Emerging and Developing 
Economies 
 
CHAPTER 1  
Inflation Targeting in Practice 
1.1 Some Thoughts on Inflation Targeting Background 
Emergence of the IT framework can be seen as a practical response to economic 
evolution in the 20th century. This evolution started in 1970 with collapse of 
the Breton Woods system. The forthcoming monetarism view elaborated by 
Milton Friedman prevailed in the economic theory in the 1980s but faced a lot of 
challenges in a number of countries due to unstable money demand. In addition, 
growing international capital mobility increased susceptibility to shocks under 
pegging exchange rate regime and low credibility of both monetary and fiscal 
policy together with high balance sheet exposure induced higher incidence of 
speculative attacks and currency crisis in the 90s (Masson et al., 1997). 
Ultimately, Hammond (2012) argues that IT with floating exchange rate 
emerged as a consensus framework vision consistent with realistic 
achievements expected from a monetary policy. 
It is generally believed that monetary framework with well anchored 
inflation expectations is able to achieve good outcome in terms of the trade-off 
between price stability and real output variability. Theoretically, this idea was 
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incorporated in 90s into the New Keynesian Phillips Curve1. Furthermore, 
inflation targeting setting is considered the most appropriate candidate for the 
optimal policy as it accounts not only for past and present actions but also for 
forward commitments of monetary authorities. As argued by Svensson (1997), 
loss function of a central bank is positively dependent on deviations of actual 
inflation from the target, therefore optimal decision of a central bank is to 
anchor inflation expectations to the target. The author also distinguishes 
between strict and flexible IT regime. The latter one is practiced by central 
banks in reality, representing a more gradual approach of achieving the target in 
a medium-term taking into account the output variability and potential shocks. 
Ultimately it creates space for other policy goals like smoothing the output and 
therefore is less costly in terms of real economy. Furthermore, it can be inferred 
that IT is mainly about anchoring inflations expectations and building credibility 
rather than hitting a target. 
IT has nowadays a rising share among other monetary policy regimes 
both in advanced and emerging economies.  
Figure 1.1: Inflation targeting countries by year of adoption (advanced 
economies –left, emerging economies – right)  
 
Source: Hammond (2012), Bank of England 
                                                        
1 NKPC:                  , and (Eπt+1 = πt), where πt- level of inflation in period t, Eπt-
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According to Bank of England estimations, at the beginning of 2012 there were 
27 countries, which explicitly target inflation, among which 8 advanced and 19 
emerging economies. The figure above represents advanced and emerging IT 
countries grouped by year of adoption and initial inflation at the time of 
targeting. It is worth mentioning that IT framework is extremely popular among 
emerging economies starting from the late 90s. It can be observed that the 
countries are very heterogeneous it terms of initial inflation by the year of 
adoption, some of them having double-digit initial inflation (Serbia, Hungary, 
Poland) contrasting with the others with already very low (South Africa, 
Thailand) or even negative inflation process (Peru), serving as evidence that 
some countries adopted the regime in order to escape from high inflation while 
others had a goal of anchoring inflation expectations at an already low level. 
 What about practical performance of inflation targeting countries, was it 
more successful than other monetary policy regimes so far?  
When it comes to empirical performance of the framework, there is no 
consensus view on its effectiveness in achieving low inflation. The critics are 
mainly addressed from the analysis of its effectiveness in developed economies 
while emerging markets seemed to be more successful in terms of causal effect 
of the regime on price stability. Having this in mind we will further provide the 
survey of most relevant literature of IT realizations focusing on two periods, 
delimited by the recent economic turndown, trying to answer if there were any 
modifications or difficulties affecting the regime. 
1.2 IT Experience Before the Crisis 
A commonly used methodology to study the influence of monetary policy 
extended in a series of studies afterwards, is proposed by Ball and Sheridan 
(2003) and represents difference–in-difference setting. The main idea is to 
divide the analysed countries into treatment (IT) and control (non-IT) 
subsamples and regress change in inflation on the IT dummy variable. The 
authors applied it to a sample of 20 OECD countries and found that inflation 
targeting did not matter for disinflationary processes or for other economic 
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improvements in selected countries. The possible interpretation of their results 
may be selection bias, as ultimate lowering of inflation is a natural outcome if 
the initial pre-targeting performance of countries is bad (Mishkin, 2001). 
Additionally, Gertler (2005) questions the choice of Ball and Sheridan’s control 
group that consisted mainly of countries with a monetary regime very close to 
inflation targeting. 
 Slightly different outcome of a similar model is generated for emerging 
economies, where a significant decrease in average inflation is registered 
(Cabral, 2006). These results are supplemented by Gonsalves and Salles (2006), 
who estimated reduction in inflation (ranging between 2-2,5%) and in output 
growth volatility (up to 1,5%), although no significant reduction in inflation 
variability was found. One may argue that difference-in-difference applied to 
cross-sections does not account for the fact of varying starting dates of the 
explicit targeting period. Gonsalves and Salles (2006) use different starting 
periods as robustness check for the results which gave the same outcome. 
Among other regime optimists are Neumann and Von Hagen (2002) who 
conclude that inflation targeting mattered for achieving disinflation and lower 
volatility of policy rates and inflation in the short-run. Although the superiority 
of the framework over other monetary policy regimes was rejected, the authors 
claim that IT-ers are much more flexible in their responses to external shocks. 
Another extension is Wu‘s (2004) analysis developed on a panel of 22 
OECD industrial economies who is applying a multi-periods difference-in-
difference to quaterly CPI inflation rate. His results gave a another space for 
interpretation of IT performance in advanced economies, particularly he finds 
that decrease of average inflation is not generated by mean reversion or 
increase in real interest rates (more aggressive monetary policy) but is rather 
caused by the effectiveness of IT framework. 
The result that IT countries outperformed on average their peers is 
suggested by Batini et al. (2006), who make an analysis of the experience of 
emerging and developing countries with the regime. Their results also shed 
light on the increased flexibility of the framework as countries that have 
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decided to implement it were able to adapt it to different initial conditions and 
country specific developments.  
Although inflation targeting in emerging economies is believed to have a 
substantial performance in terms of lowering inflation, concomitantly they face 
challenges in hitting the target due to imperfect macroeconomic environment 
with weak institutions and credibility (Fraga, Goldfajn, Minella, 2004). Hence, 
the latter highlight transparency and communication as playing the key role in 
the process of building credibility. 
As it can be noticed there are different empirical outcomes on IT 
efficiency. Apart from the shortcoming of a biased sample that causes 
endogeneity in the treatment variable argued by Mishkin (2002) and Gertler 
(2005), there is an interesting finding suggested by Mishkin and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2006) that IT performance results depend on the choice of control 
group. Thus the highest achievements in lowering inflation is obtained when 
comparing IT with their own pre-targeting levels in both industrial and 
emerging economies and there is no significant effect relative to a control group 
consisting of successful non-targeters. These results are intuitive hence the last 
already had low inflation. They also argue that once hitting the target and 
gaining credibility, IT contributed to decreasing inflation and output volatility, 
reduced their response to external shocks, improved monetary system 
efficiency and strengthened monetary policy independence.  
 A different methodology of cross-sections analysis in assessing IT 
performance is proposed by Lin and Ye (2008). Using propensity score 
matching models they concluded that IT mattered only for emerging markets in 
achieving disinflation and lower inflation volatility recalling that developing 
economies relative to advanced had bigger room for gaining credibility. 
Further we discovered evidence that IT influence on disinflation process 
varies within countries. A study of Baxa, Platil and Vasicek (2012) focusing on 
evolution of inflation dynamics in CEE countries (Czech Republic, Poland and 
Hungary) reveals an interesting perspective of IT framework in emerging 
economies. With the help of New Keynesian Phillips Curve and Bayesian 
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techniques they stress that the nature of inflation process differs significantly 
among selected countries. Though altogether they have a dominant forward-
looking component of inflation, Czech Republic is the leader when it comes to 
almost disappearing inflation persistence and low variance of inflation shocks. 
Ultimately it can be inferred that the country has most credible monetary policy 
regime with well-anchored inflation expectations. 
Gertler (2005) critics that commonly used difference-in-difference 
approach lacks empirical consistency being affected by identification problems 
and specification biases that after being controlled for also generate irrelevant 
results for inflation targeting regime performance. The author argues that 
decision to adopt the above mentioned regime is subject to reverse causality. On 
the one hand usually high inflation induces countries to target inflation; on the 
other hand the regime adoption stimulates disinflation process. This 
endogeneity makes him questioning the applicability and reliability of 
difference-in-difference methodology for the research. 
The above discussed problem was accounted by Bryto and Bystedt 
(2008) who also consider that targeting decision is not random and depends on 
some country characteristics taken at different times. The authors develop a 
dynamic panel framework that considers possible endogeneity of IT adoption 
and country and time specific characteristics that may bias OLS estimates. 
Therefore, the authors apply 2 step system Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM hereafter) estimator on unbalanced panel of 46 emerging economies and 
found evidence of IT helping to reduce inflation levels by having an adverse 
impact on output growth; however the effectiveness of the regime on lowering 
inflation is sensitive to modifications in the control group.  
A similar econometric framework (two-step system GMM) performed on 
a sample of low income countries generated optimistic results. Gemayel et al. 
(2011) obtained significant negative coefficient of IT dummy on inflation, 
inflation volatility and output growth volatility. A difference between the last 2 
authors concerns inflation-output growth trade-off, Gemayel and others 
findings suggesting no adverse impact on output growth. 
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1.3 Tackling the Crisis 
The recent financial crisis from the late 2007 was accompanied by sharp and 
persisitent decline in aggregate demand. The latter created downward pressure 
on prices and inflation, inducing monetary authorities to cut interest rates to 
zero lower bound and to use unconventional monetary policy tools. This 
situation has reassessed the role of financial stability within monetary policy 
considerations and has brought back the debate of too narrow focus of inflation 
targeting and questioning of its functionality. 
A relatively limited literature is focused on inflation targeting regime 
performance in times of economic shocks. One of the first authors who 
questioned regime effectiveness in critical times were Mishkin and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2007), who by using panel VAR impulse response functions, established 
that a treatment group of IT countries have a smaller inflation response to an oil 
price shock after 1997. Even so, this fair sensibility is observed mostly in 
emerging economies with already stationary target that managed to gain 
credibility and anchor inflation expectations. 
Neumann and von Hagen (2001) also compare inflation and interest 
rates response elasticities of the targeting and non-targeting countries during 
oil crises. Applying difference-in difference methodology they found that 
changes in both analyzed variables were smaller for the treatment group of 
inflation targeting countries, even though not statistically credible in case of 
inflation. 
One of the harshest critics to inflation targeting framework that appeared 
during the crisis was done by Stiglitz (2008) who declared that „Today, inflation 
targeting is being put to the test –and it will almost certainly fail“. From the very 
beginning the economist propagated the idea of uselessness of the regime in 
developing economies due to their sensitivity to external conditions like oil and 
food prices, which augmented by financial slowdown conditions, will worsen 
even more their development prospective. 
A potential response to Stiglitz’ critique was generated by I. De Carvalho 
Filho (2011). Using panel approach with country and time fixed effects the 
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author suggests that IT has helped to avoid deflationary pressure and to achieve 
faster recovery in terms of higher post-crisis GDP-growth, lower unemployment 
and smaller output loss and mentions that IT performance is being driven 
probably by different determinants in pre and post crisis periods. Particularly, 
in the early phases of the crisis strict monetary policy framework together with 
a flexible exchange rate regime served as shock absorber, reducing debt booms 
and demand for foreign assets. Furthermore, in the after-phase IT countries 
with well-anchored inflation expectations „can pursue more aggressive 
monetary easing“ as they have an advantage in the direction of preventing 
liquidity trap and zero lower bound on interest rates at the time of deflationary 
shocks. The effectiveness of these findings is stronger for emerging economies.  
 Among other IT optimists can be numbered Fouejieu (2012), who affirms 
that increase in policy rates and inflation volatility during the crisis was less 
pronounced for targeting countries relative to non-targeters. The author also 
mentions several factors while answering the question of why IT countries are 
expected to do better during the recent crisis. Among them can be cited 
established credibility, firm control of inflation, better fiscal management, 
smaller volatility of exchange rates and higher international reserves 
accumulation. The latter argument is very important especially for emerging 
economies since it guarantees less costly access to funding in international 
markets as they do not have a global lender of last resort (Calvo, 2010). 
A different perspective of inflation targeting policy setting is brought by 
Benecka et al. (2012), who elaborate on central bank‘s ability to maintain price 
stability in relation to its financial exposure. This fact is being extremely 
important especially after the recent crisis. Employing a panel approach and 
extending the framework proposed by Kluh and Stella (2008), the authors got 
the results, which confirm the influence predominantly of IT and other variables 
such as level of economic development, capital account openness and fixed 
exchange rate regime on achieving lower inflation rather than of selected 
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As mentioned earlier the recent financial crisis has resulted in reaching of zero 
lower bound by some central banks and forcing them to use unconventional 
monetary policy instruments. Consequently, it has led to a reassessment of the 
possibility of price level targeting (PLT) to be an alternative to inflation 
targeting framework when overcoming the deflationary pressure. Similar to IT, 
PLT establishes a nominal anchor (price index) as a main tool of monetary 
policy conduit. In contrast to IT, almost forward looking regime, PLT also takes 
into consideration past developments of the index. To put it simply, if in 
previous period price level increased by some level from a theoretical base, next 
year it will have to decrease back to the targeted path. 
Both Svensson (1996), Clarida et al. (1999) argue that PLT improves 
long-run trade-off between inflation and output variability. In addition 
Svensson(1996) shows that in countries with high output persistence PLT can 
be seen as more efficient framework. These conclusions are however sensitive 
to assumptions (Bohm, 2012), and in the short run, PLT causes the opposite 
effect on volatility of output and inflation. In addition existing models are too 
simple to capture the complexity of the framework and lack of practical 
experience induce doubts in the effectiveness of the regime.  
Interestingly, Cecchetti and Kim (2005) mention the hybrid targeting 
which combines both price level and inflation targeting framework because of 
dual persistence of backward and forward looking individuals in the economy. 
However, the complexity of the resulting regime is expected to be too high and 
multiple objectives will significantly complicate the communication process and 
adjustment of expectations of the agents. 
Despite the fact that theoretically PLT looks effective in reducing 
uncertainty about future prices in the long run, there are serious doubts to 
consider it as an alternative to IT framework. First, even in long horizon the 
costs of stabilisation remain high (Gerberding, 2010). Second, existing models 
do not capture all the complexities of the real economy. Third, practical 
experience is too distant and vague to make any valuable assumptions. Finally, 
despite its increased trasparency, PLT framework complicates communication 
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process of modern central bank and affects agents‘ ability to form inflation 
expectations thus generating time-inconsistency problem. 
As we can observe numerous aspects of IT are discussed in the literature 
and ambiguous conclusions can be drawn. First of all it is associated with no 
significant effect in improving macroeconomic conditions in advanced 
economies. IT effectiveness on lowering and stabilizing inflation and real 
economy is rather believed in EME, although they face numerous challenges in 
implementing the regime, like the lack of credibility and transparency and very 
frequent target missing. At the same time in order to anchor inflation 
expectations and establish good reputation, these countries also have more 
space for improvement. The recent global economic and financial slowdown did 
not significantly reverse these findings. Nevertheless, a general inference which 
can be drawn is that IT setting has a “non-negative” performance (Walsh, 2009). 
It did not worsen economic conditions of countries that operate with it as 
monetary framework even after the crisis, hence no country has left IT regime 
so far, except Slovak Republic, Spain and Finland, which abandoned it due to 
entering the euro area. Roger and Stone (2005) assign this resilience of the 
inflation targeting to “the flexibility of the framework, high standards of 







The Analytical Framework 
This chapter highlights empirical framework applied for testing inflation 
targeting regime effectiveness. Hence, it covers the procedure of sample 
selection, description of the econometric set-up and empirical results obtained 
in the proposed specification. 
2.1 Sample Selection and Preliminary Data Analysis 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the effectiveness of a monetary policy regime 
particularly focusing on emerging and developing economies unlike all major 
studies oriented towards advanced and emerging markets. Inflation behavior is 
examines based on percentage change in annual CPI ranging from 1997 to 2011 
(15 years) selected from International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook 
database (IMF WEO). 
Since in one of our hypothesis we want to analyze the IT policy impact on 
different territories, we chose all countries from different regions where IT 
regime is adopted. We employ a size cut off of 10 billion USD dollars in 2004 
nominal GDP (median year from our sample) to improve comparability among 
countries. Additionally we restrict our sample to countries with available data 
for the variable of interest (which excludes Lithuania and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina) and to countries that adopted IT prior to 2009 (which excludes 
Serbia), so that we have at least 3 years of reaction to the policy. For Bulgaria 
one observation (1997Y) was dropped due to extremely high CPI rate above 
1000 percent thus unbalancing our sample panel. 
Ultimately we ended up with 43 emerging and developing economies out 
of which 15 are inflation targeters (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ghana, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Indonesia, Peru, Philippines, Turkey, South Africa, Thailand, 
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Guatemala, Mexico) and 28 have other monetary policy regimes. As a 
robustness check, a group of CIS countries which match the previously 
mentioned criteria is added to the control group. The first country from our 
treatment group to adopt inflation targeting regime is Poland (1998) and the 
last one is Ghana (2007). Initial panel analysis, time series plot and descriptive 
statistics of the data and are presented in table A.1, table A.2, figure A.1, 
Appendix A.  
The figure below is a graphical representation of table A.3, Appendix A. It 
represents average inflation for the selected sample.  
Figure 2.1: Average inflation for the selected sample 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data selected from IMF WEO. 
In case of inflation targeting countries it also includes average inflation prior 
and after regime adoption. Almost all countries from our treatment group have 
lower average inflation after the regime adoption; the only exception is Brazil, 
but it may be caused by low number of observations for NIT-ing period as 
country adopted the framework in 1999, while our sample starts in 1997. In 
general terms, on the overall sample, the inflation targeters have on average 7 
percentage lower inflation than the control group of countries with other 
monetary policy regimes.When speaking about the volatility of inflation, it also 
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has had almost 23 percentage points higher value for non-targeters than for our 
treatment group (figure A.2, appendix A). 
2.2 Model Specification 
Apart from endogeneity of regime adoption mentioned by Gertler(2005) and 
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002, 2007), establishing inflation targeting 
regime may be very often related to country’s individual characteristics and 
time trends (Brito, Bystedt, 2008) which cannot be captured by cross-section 
difference-in-difference analysis. Therefore we will employ techniques of 
dynamic panel data with country and time fixed effects measuring change 
caused by IT adoption on inflation (inflation variability) for a treatment group 
over a specific period relative to control group for the same period accounting 
for potential reverse causality and omitted variable bias. 
The framework is similar to Bryto and Bystedt (2008) paper discussed 
earlier, applied on a different sample of emerging and developing economies. 
Consequently, we develop a more recent framework analysis on a time span 
dating from 1997 up to 2011. Further, inflation is summed over 3 year periods’, 
thus maintaining the long memory of the series, giving time for a slow reaction 
and at the same time keeping the number of instruments low, which is 
necessary condition for GMM estimation2. Finally, we employ a similar 
transformation of inflation: , ,100* ln(1 /100)i t i ty CPI   due to low number of 
countries in a sample and substantial skeweness detected in the data (table A.2, 
appendix A), which may affect the inference. As proposed by the authors we 
introduce a threshold dummy to control for high inflation as it can bias the 
results in favor of IT. Thus it takes value of one in case CPI is higher than 50 
percent. Finally, the lagged dependent variable is included in the model to 
account for potential reversion to mean. 
The measure of inflation volatility is obtained using 3 years standard 
deviation of detrended inflation, which is done via Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter 
                                                        
2 GMM framework is suited for samples with large N and small T. Big number of instruments 
may overfit the IV variables and bias the results. 
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as suggested by Horvath, Mateju, (2011). The authors suggest that it helps to 
capture true inflation development as some countries adopted IT as a part of 
their disinflation strategy. HP filter does nothing but separating cyclical 
component of the data from long-term trend: ,t t ty c  with yt being the 
original series, t  - the trend component and ct – the cyclical part. 




min( ( ) * [( ) ( )] )
T T
t t t t t tt t
y

     

  
                                               (1) 
The first term, sum of squared deviations of the original time series from the 
trend, penalizes the cyclical component (ct). It is augmented by the sum of 
squares of the trend second differences premultiplied by  , on which depends 
series smoothness. For our analysis we use  =10, which is suggested by Baxter 
and King (1999) for annual data. Ultimately we average the detrended series 
over 3 year periods: 











                                                                           (2) 
where   stands for already HP detrended inflation record and   is average 
inflation for 3 years periods. When choosing the appropriate number of years 
we were trying to be consistent with the baseline model specification discussed 
further, where inflation variable is summed over 3 periods. In addition, we 
believe that more recent inflation developments matter to a greater extent in 
policy implications. As a robustness analysis, inflation volatility is calculated as 
3 years standard deviation on original series without removing the trend. 
Analysis is performed on original series taken from the same source: IMF WEO 
database. 
With all the transformations being explained, the baseline model will be 
estimated using the following equation: 
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ity  variable of interest (transformed inflation, inflation volatility) for country 
i=1,2,...,N at time t=1,2,...,T ; 
itX a vector of possible endogenous variables. In our case { , }it it itX d high ; 
itd dummy variable equal to 1, if country i is targeting inflation at time t, and 
equal to 0, otherwise; 
ithigh dummy variable controlling for high inflation , equal to 1 if inflation is 
higher than a threshold level of 50%, and equal to 0, otherwise. 
( )t i it     composite error term with  
t  capturing time fixed effects; i  standing for country fixed effects and it  
including the remainder effects. 
Inclusion of lagged dependent variable creates an important econometric 
problem. By construction ity is a function of  and i t  , therefore , 1i ty  is also a 
function of individual-level and time-level effects. As shown by Nickel, the right-
hand side regressor is correlated with the error term, which causes simple OLS 
estimates to be biased and inconsistent even if it  is not serially correlated. 
Even if within estimation in panel data sweeps these effects away, 
( ) ( )it i it i it iy y x x       ,                                                                                          (4) 
iy  is correlated with i as the average values include lagged variables and
, 1 , 1( ) 0i t i tE y    . Therefore Least Squares Dummy Variable estimator will also 
be biased and its consistency will depend upon T being enough large. Random 
Effects estimator will also be biased due to correlation between transformed 
dependent variable and disturbance term. Moreover, the bias can be created as 
well when explanatory variables are correlated with lagged dependent variable. 
This problem is usually solved by applying Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). We start with the 
same initial model, by first-differencing the data we remove individual effects: 
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, 1 , 1 , 2 2 , 1 , 1( ) ( ) ( )it i t i t i t it i t it i ty y y y x x                                                          (5) 
However, there is still correlation between lagged dependent variable and 
disturbance term which is now a MA(1) process3.  
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggested using all past information as 
instruments. For the third period we have the following form of the equation: 
3 2 2 1 3 2 3 2( ) ( ) ( )i i i i i i i iy y y y x x                                                                        (6) 
Here we may choose 1iy as valid instrument as it is highly correlated with 2iy
and not correlated with 3i , assuming that there is no serial autocorrelation in 
the residuals. Continuing the logic, for t=4, we obtain 
1 2 3 and as valid instruments for i i iy y y  and so on, for each following period we 
are adding one additional instrument. In case we have strictly exogenous 
regressors itx , then we add them as instruments ( 1 2[ , ,..., ]
T T T
i i iTx x x )for the first-
differentiated equation. If itx  is predetermined instead, we add only 
1 2 ( 1)[ , ,..., ]
T T T
i i i sx x x   to each diagonal element of the matrix of all instruments ( iZ ) 
as valid instruments for period s4. 
1 1 2
1, 2 1 2 3
1 , 2 1 . 1
[ , , ] 0 ... 0
0 [ , , , ] ...
0 0
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           
This technique is known as Arellano-Bond estimator, which generates moment 
conditions by combing lagged dependent variable and the predetermined 
variables with first-differences of the disturbances.  
However lagged-levels of dependent variables were found to be weak 
instruments if AR process is highly persistent (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
Therefore we give preference to two-step system GMM estimator which 
                                                        
3 As they contain , 1 , 1 and i t i ty    
4 Necessary condition of strictly exogenous regressors:
E(x ν )= 0 for  t, s. In case of predetermined variable E(x ν ) 0 for s > t and 0 otherwise.it it it it   
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imposes an additional orthogonality condition between lagged explanatory 
variables and levels of disturbances. It is also believed to be better instrumented 
and capture the highly persistent inflation targeting dummy variable (Bryto, 
Bystedt, 2008). Finally, by using 2-step finite sample corrected residuals we 
create a consistent variance-covariance matrix robust to panel-specific 
autocorrelations and heteroskedasticity. 
Besides testing the above discussed model on our original sample we 
perform sensitivity analysis on a modified one. First, we exclude each 
geographical group from estimations. Second, we attach to our control group 
countries from CIS region that satisfy the selection criteria. Additionally, after 
the dynamic panel estimation we perform several tests. First, we present 
Arrelano-Bond test for autocorrelations applied to first-differenced residuals. 
Usually the test for AR(1) process is expected to reject the null of no 
autocorrelations; the AR(2) test is of higher interest for us, since it detects 
autocorrelation in levels. Next, Hansen J test assesses the overall validity of 
applied instruments, and difference-in-Hansen statistics valuates exogeneity of 
additional moment conditions. Failure to reject the last two is an argument in 
favour of the proposed model. 
Next we explicitly present equations for testing of our hypotheses. The 
first one will be assessed by: 
, 1         it i t it it t i ity y d high v                                                                        (7) 
We are interested in the sign and significance of the coefficient β. Following our 
hypothesis of IT countries experiencing lower inflation and inflation volatility 
on average compared to control group, β is expected to be significant and 
negative. In case when there is only mean reversion process found in Ball and 
Sheridan (2005), only α will be significant indicating an AR(1) process whose 
stationarity will depend upon the absolute value of the coefficient5.  
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In order to test if our hypotheses hold for the period during the crisis we 
introduce an interaction variable between inflation targeting dummy and crisis, 
so that our new model has the form: 
0 , 1 * *           it i t it t it t i ity y d crisis high v                                                   (8) 
where crisist  is a new dummy variable indicating whether time period is 
incorporating the crisis (i.e equal to 1 from 2007Y onwards). Coefficient   
captures the interaction of crisis proxy with inflation targeting dummy thus 
isolating the effect of the analyzed regime only for the period of the recent 
financial turndown, keeping other factors constant. Taking into account the 
findings of Carvalho Filho (2011) that inflation targeting framework has helped 
countries to avoid deflationary trap and zero lower bound on policy rates,   is 
expected to be less negative. In this paper we attempt to test if it holds for 
emerging and developing economies. 
When testing our next hypothesis regarding contrasting performance of 
the regime in different geographical regions6 we propose the OLS equation: 
0 1 1 2 3
4
* * * * * *
      * *
t t t t t
t t t
y y d CEE d ASIA d LATAM
d AFRICA high e
    
 

     
  
                           (9) 
In order to capture regional differences in performance between inflation 
targeting countries we create interaction variables between two dummies, one 
is IT dummy and the other is responsible for regions tabulation7. Ultimately 
coefficient θ1 will represent the effect of the framework in CEE countries 
keeping other factors constant. The same logic applies to θ2, θ3, θ4 that are 
incorporating the effect of inflation performance in Asia, Latin America and 
Africa respectively. The rest of the world with other regimes is captured in the 
constant term ( 0 ). For consistency we still control for mean reversion and high 
inflation. We expect region coefficients to be negative to reflect monetary policy 
                                                        
6 Regions were distinguished according to IMF WEO classification. 
7 i.e CEE=1 if region is Central and Eastern Europe and equals to 0 otherwise, ASIA=1 if region is 
Developing Asia  and equals to 0 otherwise, LATAM=1 if region is Latin America and Caribbean  
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effectiveness. Any significant differences in absolute value of the coefficients 
will reflect the fact that a particular region has a better regime performance 
over analysed timeframe. 
We start our estimation by simple pooled cross-section OLS adding 
consequently time (TE-OLS) and country fixed effects (CTE-OLS) thus 
accounting for individual heterogeneity across countries (time invariant 
countries’ specific shocks and developments) as well as for time patterns 
common to overall sample (periods of high inflation or other imbalances that 
were perceived globally). For this purpose, dummy variables both for time and 
country effects are created and all but one are included into regression. Further 
we present the results of difference GMM estimation when treating inflation 
targeting dummy as predetermined. Next we present two specifications of 
system GMM framework, first by assuming that inflation targeting is 
predetermined and then, accounting for Gertler’s (2005) and Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel’s (2002) critique, we treat the mentioned variable as 
endogenous. Presentation of all the specifications will allow us to better 
understand the dynamics of the results as model is adapted to potential 
identification problems. 
2.3 Empirical Findings 
The estimation results of the equation (8) performed on a panel of 43 emerging 





Table 2.1: Estimates of Inflation Targeting on Inflation and Inflation Volatility 






















































AR(1)test    0,20 0,19 0,08 
AR(2)test    0,38 0,34 0,33 
Hansen J 
test 
   0,23 0,46 0,53 
Diff.-in-
Hansen 
    0,95 0,97 
Instrum.    24 34 33 
Observ. 171 171 171 128 171 171 
R2 0,73 0,74 0,71    
 
1.B Dependent variable: inflation volatility 










































AR(1)test    0,14 0,13 0,17 
AR(2)test    0,24 0,17 0,19 
Hansen J 
test 
   0,54 0,96 0,90 
Diff.-in-
Hansen 
    1,00 0,86 
Instrum.    24 34 33 
Observ. 171 171 171 128 171 171 
R2 0,52 0,52 0,45    
Note: * statistically significant at 10% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, *** 
statistically significant at 1% level. CPI inflation is transformed: yi,t = 100*ln(1+CPIi,t/100)and 
summed over 3 years. Inflation volatility is proxied by standard deviation of HP detrended CPI 
over 3 years. Column (1) includes pooled cross-sections OLS, in (2) and (3) time-fixed effect (TE-
OLS) and country fixed-effect (CTE-OLS) are added respectively. Robust standard errors 
clustered by country are presented in paranthesis. Column (4) depicts two-step Arrelano-Bond 
difference GMM estimator. Next 2 columns make use of two-step system-GMM estimator which 
 
 
2. The Analytical Framework                                                                                                          24 
 
takes inflation targeting dummy as predetermined (5) and as endogenous variable (6). Two-
step robust standard errors corrected for finite sample are presented in paranthesis. AR(1), 
AR(2), Hansen J test and Difference-in-Hansen test report the respective p-values.  
Column 1 in table 2.1 shows the result of pooled cross-sections OLS without 
country and time fixed effects with robust standard errors. The estimates are 
consistent with our expectations that inflation targeting has helped to reduce 
average inflation (almost by 5 percent, panel 1.A) as well as inflation volatility 
(by 83 basis points, panel 1.B) and with existing studies of Batini et al. (2006), 
Lin and Ye (2008), Gemayel et al. (2011) although with different absolute values 
on inflation reduction. Lagged inflation contributes little to explaining present 
level of inflation, the respective coefficient being smaller than 1 % in both 
specifications, which contrasts Ball and Sheridan’s reversion to the mean 
explanation. The dummy for high inflation is significant for both measures of 
economic performance, indicating that in high inflation periods we can observe 
higher volatility of the variable. 
 The inclusion of time effects in the estimation (column 2) does not 
significantly modify the results similarly to Bryto and Bystedt (2008) findings. 
The only noticeable change we can observe is that coefficient on inflation 
targeting dummy reduction increases by 40 basis points suggesting that 
omission of time dummies understates the true relation between inflation 
targeting and level of inflation. Inflation volatility reduction remains practically 
the same, although smaller in absolute value than estimates of Batini et al. 
(2006) and Gemayel et al. (2011).  
Column 3 depicts the results for 2 way error component model for panel 
data with country and time fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by 
country. As it was mentioned earlier, inclusion of lagged inflation in the model 
biases the results as it creates correlation between dependent variable and the 
error term. Hence, we obtained positive although not very insignificant impact 
of IT regime on inflation and inflation volatility. The coefficients of lagged and 
high inflation remain significant although differing in absolute value compared 
to previous specifications. 
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In the next column we employ two-step difference GMM estimation by treating 
IT dummy as predetermined and accounting for endogeneity of highit. Similar to 
Bryto and Bystedt (2008) for periods t≥3, we take , 2 , 1 , 2( ; ; )n t j n t j n t jy d high      for 
j=0, 1,..., t-3 as available instruments. We still include time dummies for 
consistency of the estimation. There is no sign of first or second order 
autocorrelation in the residuals and Hansen statistics does not allow us to reject 
the overall validity of the model. Nevertheless, the estimation results are not 
supporting our hypothesis. The IT coefficient is positive and insignificant for 
average inflation equation and negative but still insignificant for inflation 
volatility specification. The uncertain results of this model specification may be 
a sign of weak validity of past levels of inflation to be appropriate instruments 
for its present behaviour. The latter creates a necessity to apply system GMM 
estimator, given an additional fact of high persistence of IT dummy variable. 
The next two columns exhibit coefficients obtained after two-step system 
GMM estimation with robust standard errors corrected for finite sample. In 
column 5 we treat dit as predetermined and highit as endogenous variable. Like 
in column 4, for t≥3, we have instruments , 2 , 1 , 2( ; ; )n t j n t j n t jy d high       for j=0, 
1,...,t-3 for equation in differences and , 1 , , 1( ; ; )n t n t n ty d high     for equation in 
levels. Now we obtain a negative sign of IT coefficient on average inflation 
which, however, lacks statistical significance. In case of inflation volatility it is 
smaller by 9 basis points than in OLS estimation and significant at 99% 
confidence level. In both specifications there is no serial autocorrelation in the 
differenced residuals and Hansen and difference-in-Hansen tests assess the 
overall validity of the instruments used. 
Finally, in column 6 we account for potential endogeneity of IT adoption 
discussed earlier by addressing inflation targeting proxy as endogenous 
variable and high inflation dummy as predetermined. In this case for t≥3, we 
have instruments , 2 , 2 , 1( ; ; )n t j n t j n t jy d high       for j=0, 1,...,t-3 for equation in 
differences and , 1 , 1 ,( ; ; )n t n t n ty d high     for equation in levels. The obtained 
results are more negative than in all previous specifications and in line with our 
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hypothesis. With 95% confidence we can say that inflation targeting regime 
caused diminishing of inflation by 5,6 percent per year more relative to 
countries with other monetary policy frameworks. The result is consistent, 
although higher in absolute value, with Batini et al.(2006) and Gemayel et al. 
(2011) findings for emerging economies. There is a sign of first-order 
autocorrelation and no evidence of second-order dependence in the residuals. 
Moreover, we do not reject the Hansen’s test null of exogeneity of applied 
instruments as well as the validity of additional instruments examined by 
difference-in-Hansen statistics, which makes us to believe that model was 
correctly specified. Similar to Brito and Bystedt (2008), the estimates for 
inflation volatility do not change relative to previous specification, revealing the 
fact that the main source of the bias was coming from reverse causality between 
inflation targeting and average inflation. So far, IT regime favoured inflation 
volatility reduction by 73 basis points, which is relatively small compared to 
Batini et al. (2006) estimates of 3,6 percent.  
Thus, accounting for potential reverse causality of IT adoption and 
country and time fixed effects we supported our hypothesis of the effectiveness 
of the regime on an unbalanced panel of 43 emerging and developing countries 
over the period of 1997-2011. We check the sensitivity of our results by 
modifying our sample of countries. First, we include a group of CIS countries in 
the control group and then, we exclude each region of the world from the 
sample. The results (presented in table A.5, appendix A) preponderantly 
support our baseline findings of positive effect of inflation targeting regime on 
disinflation even when accounting for potential endogeneity. The β coefficients 
are significantly in line with previous findings and in some cases even more 
negative than before. Additionally, we check our measure of volatility, by 
applying the same model on a series without having detrending it (table A.7, 
appendix A). We obtained practically the same parameter estimations in new 
specification meaning that effect of IT on inflation volatility is robust to our 
initial specification.  
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Next, in order to test if inflation targeting impact on inflation and inflation 
volatility holds during the crisis period, we just add an interaction variable 
between inflation targeting proxy and new time dummy responsible for crisis 
period. Then, we apply the previously mentioned models with analogous 
assumptions and instruments for dynamic panel, which results can be found in 
appendix A, table A.4. 
Notably, we discovered negative impact of the regime on inflation in all 6 
empirical specifications. Our main finding is that during the crisis period the 
difference in average inflation between IT and NIT countries remained to be 
around 5 percentage points being significant at 95 percent confidence interval. 
The absolute value of the coefficient lies between TE-OLS and CTE-OLS 
revealing the signs of the biases. The Arellano-Bond tests exposes signs of first 
order autocorrelation in differenced residuals and no autocorrelation of the 
second order. High p-value of the Hansen and difference-in-Hansen tests does 
not allow us to reject the overall validity of the instruments. Interestingly, the 
absolute value of the coefficients of interest (column 5 and column 6) is almost 
similar to results from table 2.1. In further estimation we tried to test the model 
with dit and dit*crisis interaction dummies together, thus isolating the IT effect in 
the crisis while controlling for normal times IT influence. Following this logic, 
the model will take the form: 
0 , 1 1 2* * *             it i t it it t it t i ity y d d crisis high v                                (10) 
Thus 1  incorporates “normal effect” of the regime, while 2  outlines what was 
different in the crisis time in terms of IT impact. The estimated results can be 
found in table A.6, appendix A.  
Overall, the depicted coefficients are less negative, although they lack 
statistical meaning. This suggests that there is a lot of multicolinearity between 
IT dummy and its interaction with the crisis proxy. We assume that it may be 
explained by the fact that most of the countries employed in our analysis have 
adopted IT quite recently, which is often the case for emerging and developing 
economies. This would also explain why the results in table 2.1 and table A.4 are 
very similar.  
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Nevertheless, our results for inflation volatility (panel 2B, table A.6 and table 
A.4, Appendix A) in system-GMM framework are consistent with findings of 
Fouejieu (2012), and namely the variability of inflation was smaller by almost 
1% in inflation targeting countries, proving that the magnitude of inflation 
changes was less sensed by targeting countries probably because of higher 
credibility and anchored inflation expectations that rendered targeting central 
banks with more flexibility in response to the external shocks. The estimate 
coefficient of interaction is significant at 10%. IT dummy takes opposite sign but 
it lacks statistical certainty. Lagged inflation volatility and high inflation proxy 
take similar values as in table A.4. Therefore we are not able to tell with 
confidence if the regime performance differs for the pre-crisis and crisis periods 
in selected sample of 43 emerging and developing economies. 
As for our next hypothesis regarding IT performance in different regions 
we obtained the following results: 
Table 2.2: Estimates of Inflation Targeting on Inflation in Different 
Regions of the World. Dependent variable: CPI inflation (y-o-y change). 









Lagged Inflation 0,41*** 
(0,10) 






Note: * statistically significant at 10% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, *** 
statistically significant at 1% level. CPI inflation is transformed: yi,t = 
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Basically, the sign of the coefficients responsible for region’s IT performance are 
consistent with baseline model findings. Almost all regions have reliable negative 
responses that show average inflation lowering of 5 percentage points. We did not 
find a substantial discrepancy in absolute values of the estimates that allows us to 
believe that a particular region obtained higher inflation reduction. Although African 
countries are exception from the last observation, its coefficient is statistically not 
valid. It is probably due to the fact that we have only two targeting countries within 
African region in our sample, which appears to be insufficient for determining the 









Popularity of  IT regime among emerging markets has been constantly 
increasing recently. Nevertheless, it did not settle down the existing disputes on 
whether targeting choice is argumented. Additionally, the recent financial crisis 
has reconsidered the argument of a too limited objective of the regime. The 
present part of the paper has attempted to provide an empirically argumented 
basis on the existing conflict. Giving the fact that there is a relatively low 
number of studies that focus on developing economies, we decided to include 
them in our analysis. 
The first part of this thesis is focused on IT perfomance in emerging and 
developing economies. We start by discussing the current state of the literature 
concerning IT performance delimiting between the normal and crisis times. The 
ambiguity of the existing works has motivated us to perform our own analysis 
of the regime effectiveness taking into account potential biases of previous 
studies. Therefore, we employ dynamic panel estimators to control for reverse 
causality of IT adoption frequently discussed by regime opponents, and 
investigate policy impact on lowering inflation and inflation volatiliy in both 
normal and crisis times.  
Overall, our results support the regime effectiveness. After controling for 
potential endogeneity, mean reversion and for the persistence of high inflation 
we obtained negative parameter estimates of IT dummy on both inflation and 
volatility of inflation. Our results on inflation reduction are robust to 
modification in both treatment and control groups. On the one hand, the 
estimated coefficient for inflation reduction (5,6%) is slightly higher in absolute 
value than in most previous studies which support the regime. On the other 
hand we obtained a comparatively lower coefficient (73 basis points) for 
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volatility reduction caused by IT. We believe it may be a consequence of 
inclusion of a big number of developing coutries in our sample that might have 
had a much stronger effect of the regime. These findings are robust to 
modifications in both the control group of non-IT and in the treatment group of 
IT countries.  
However, the ultimate impact of IT on the selected sample of countries 
during the turmoil periods is undeterminable. The estimated parameters on 
disinflation and its volatility were similar to previous model findings, but we 
could not differentiate the crisis period influence from the ”normal times” due 
to relatively short time from the regime adoption by most developing countries 
from our sample, that creates high collinearity between the analysed variables.  
When it comes to our second hypothesis, according to our empirical 
results, there is no significant difference in absolute value of IT performance 
among different regions of the world. Moreover the values of the estimated 
parameters were mostly in line with baseline model specification. Exception 
was represented by the group of African countries for which we obtained 
insignificant coefficient. However, we believe it is caused by a relatively small 
number of currently targeting African economies included in a treatment group 
that might have had insufficient explanatory power. 
Despite the broad arguments addresing IT ineffectiveness, our results 
support the regime and imply that shifting to IT will lower both inflation and 
inflation volatility. One might argue that these promising results are subject to 
several caveats. First, the inclusion in a sample of both emerging and developing 
economies makes it difficult to distinct the findings between the economies. 
However, we believe initial country selection criteria of simalar macroeconomic 
performance allows us to generalize the results. Second, most of the countries 
did not reach a stationary target and therefore, the results can serve rather as a 
short and medium run effect. Third, when claiming our conclusions we did not 
account for a potential macroeconomic cost at which IT effectiveness could have 
come. Therefore, an interestng question for further research would be the 
reaction of other variables and particularly, if disinflation comes at a price of 
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higher trade-off with regard to output. Finally, as stated in Gemayel et al. 
(2011), IT causality on inflation reduction in low-income countires is difficult to 
fully assess as it may be partially influenced by another factors such as 
structural and policy reforms that comes together with targeting decision. 
In the second part we considered the IT framework’s applicability to a 
particular developing country - Republic of Moldova. We provide insights into 
National Bank of Moldova monetary policy, develop an analytical basis of IT 
preconditions meeting, as well as make a monetary transmission mechanism 






PART II  
Case Study on the Developing Economy: Inflation 
Targeting Preliminary Experience of the Republic of 
Moldova. 
The second part of the work focuses on the Republic of Moldova IT regime 
behavior within its starting steps. We begin in Chapter 4 by describing the 
experience of inflation targeting for some developing countries, and then we 
discuss the National Bank of Moldova policy implementation framework and 
first realizations of the IT regime. Next we make in Chapter 5 an attempt to 
analyze operating transmission mechanism of available monetary policy tools 
using Vector Autoregression models. The second part ends in Chapter 6 with an 




Inflation Targeting in Moldova 
4.1 Emerging of IT in Some Developing Economies 
Usually developing countries experience difficulties in implementing both 
institutional conditions (Masson, Savastano, Sharma, (1997)) and technical ones 
(Eichengreen et al., 1999). Although in past it was considered a necessity to 
fulfil these requirements for a successful framework implementation, some 
countries did not fully correspond and still made progress in achieving the main 
goal of price stability. Moreover it generated a view that the fully meeting of 
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these conditions is not a must as countries converge to them gradually after the 
adoption (Batini and Laxton, 2006). Further, we present initial experience of 
several countries. 
Turkey experience with IT is described by Kara (2006). The country 
officially adopted IT in 2006 after a smooth transition from an exchange rate 
peg. Weak initial conditions, high fiscal dominance, sensitivity of government 
debt to exchange rate shocks, low central bank independence, uncertain 
transmission mechanism motivated monetary authorities to start with an 
intermediate regime with the basic ingredients of the IT, in which the country 
started developing institutional capacity necessary for framework 
implementation. The outcome of the transitory regime outpaced the 
expectations; inflation was lowered from significantly high levels to single digit 
numbers, inflation expectations were anchored, CBT obtained independence, 
imposing of fiscal discipline and cooperation with government policies was seen 
as a good sign and helped to gain credibility from the public. As a conclusion 
Kara (2006) underlines policy support, institutional independence and 
commitment to floating ER regime as the main factors of successful 
implementation of the regime in Turkish economy. 
Bank of Albania officially adopted IT in 2009 after 5 years of 
preparations. Since 1992, stable macroeconomic situation and low inflation 
environment, catalyzed economic growth and placed the country in a more 
favourable position than other transitional countries (Gemayel et al., 2011). Luci 
and Ibrahimi (2007) mention that problems with IT adoption in Albania are to a 
greater extent technical rather than institutional, as the Bank of Albania has 
already been granted independence and has price stability as its main objective. 
Hence, the main impediments seem to be building a macroeconomic model for 
the economy with clear transmission mechanism and good forecasting power 
and establishing efficient communication with the economic agents. 
Ghana was the second country in Africa to officially adopt IT framework 
in 2007. Following the experience of other countries it started with several 
years of preparations aimed at creating stable environment, achieving policy 
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instruments independence, building transparency. Gemayel et al. (2011) notice 
that since the framework adoption country never hit the targeted range of 5 p.p. 
+/-1 p.p. because of global food and oil shocks, expansionary fiscal policy, and 
negative interest rates that had created inflationary pressures at the time of 
regime adoption. So far, country still needs to make progress in financial sector 
stabilization, improve communication and transparency and not least, to anchor 
inflation expectations. 
4.2 Issues on IT adoption in Moldova 
The National Bank of Moldova (NBM hereafter) has a history of more than 20 
years, starting in 1991 after the country has obtained independence. Its 
autonomy and independence is granted by law and the primary objective is 
achieving and maintaining price stability. Without prejudice to main prerogative 
of creating a low-inflation environment, NBM needs to support Government 
policies aimed at sustainable economic growth and employment of the 
population.  
The idea to target inflation appeared in 2008 and was considered as the 
most suitable framework for attaining the main policy objective of price 
stability in the context of available policy instruments, current economic 
environment and successful experience of other countries. After 2 years of 
preparations the IT was adopted by the Bank Board (Council of Administration) 
as official monetary policy regime pursued by NBM. It is worth mentioning that 
before 2010 the NBM practiced floating exchange rate regime with clearly 
stated aim of stable prices. Even though IT assumes pure floating, NBM reserves 
the right to intervene in foreign exchange market without having any particular 
exchange rate objective and in case it is not undermining its primary goal of 
price stability. Regime adoption came altogether with substantial banking 
environment legal framework modifications and namely with amendments and 
corrections to the Law on financial institutions (nr.550 of 21.07.1995) and Law 
on guaranteeing deposits of individuals in the banking system (nr.575 of 
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26.12.2003) aimed at creating of a new banking supervising entity and of a 
National Committee for Financial Stability. 
The basic prerequisites for IT adoption argued by Masson et al. (1997) 
are Central Bank independence and primacy of inflation objective. The first 
precondition of conducting a monetary policy separately from other policies is 
granted by law on the NBM, which grants monetary authority autonomy and 
independence from political influence and prohibits the bank from financing the 
Government and other institutions. However a high budget deficit (existing even 
at the time of adoption) and superficial capital markets may create premises of 
fiscal dominance and undermine the Central Bank’s reputation and overall 
effectiveness of pursued monetary policy. The second precondition of no firm 
commitment to target other nominal variable is stipulated in law and in the 
medium term strategy of the NBM stating that other objectives are followed 
only in case they do not affect the price stability. The same authors mention that 
for achieving better effectiveness and stronger consistency, monetary authority 
should create a favorable environment consisting of several important 
elements: 
i. Stated quantitative target for future inflation 
The explicit target of the NBM is 5 p.p with the variation interval of +/- 1.5 p.p 
applied on annual CPI change. The CPI was selected as targeted inflation index 
in the first place because it is historically perceived by the public, it is not 
subject to reviews being available in due time. Not least, it preserves the 
principle of separation of interests between the institution that collects the data 
and estimates the index and institution that has inflation as main policy 
objective. The targeted number is supposed to gradually diminish over time as 
inflation expectations are better anchored and reputation is established. The 
target is maintained using main policy instrument – rate for the open market 
operations and complementary policy tools – standing facilities, required 
reserves ratio and foreign exchange interventions. 
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ii. Existence of methodological framework for producing veridical 
forecasts 
The information about applied forecasting models is not published officially. 
Even though the Monetary policy strategy for medium-term (2012) mentions 
that econometric models are under a continuous development, they face a lot of 
challenges represented by poor methodological knowledge, adjustment of the 
agents to the new regime and lack of the historical data necessary to analyze the 
effectiveness of propagation mechanism. Nevertheless the bank has the ultimate 
goal of establishing the interest rate channel as the prevalent one for monetary, 
foreign exchange and credit markets dynamics. 
iii. Forward-looking operating procedure  
The NBM adjusts its policy instruments in line with the deviations of the 
forecasted inflation and the targeted one. Even so economic agents still need to 
be educated as they form their expectations in backward-looking manner. These 
completely opposing orientations may create problems in monetary 
transmission and overall effectiveness of the NBM actions. 
4.3 Preliminary Achievements of the IT Regime 
The first realizations of the regime were published in the Report on Monetary 
Policy Medium-term Strategy (2012). It mentions the next accomplishments of 
the IT framework during 2 years of implementation: 
 Gradual lowering of annual inflation rate to single digit levels, which was 
double digits 19 year in a row before 2010. However, the targeted 
interval of 5p.p. +/- 1.5p.p. was hit only in the last 3 month of 2012. As a 
result the disinflationary process was consolidated and inflation 
expectations were anchored under 10 percent level as stated by the NBM 
in the report on monetary policy. 
 Building and maintaining the transparency was one of the main goals 
along the period of implementation of the regime. It was materialized 
through an increased and continuous communication with the public 
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aimed at reducing informational asymmetries and increasing the 
predictability of monetary actions. The NBM started publishing monthly 
press-releases of Board decisions including voting of the Board members 
(with a 6 month delay) and quarterly inflation reports, which as a result 
has increased credibility and reputation of the bank to the public. 
However when it comes to forecasting model used by the bank staff, it is 
neither published nor explained. This uncertainty may undermine the 
transparency and overall transmission mechanism of the monetary 
policy. 
 Enhancing accountability to the Parliament and economic agents through 
public hearings and participation in parliamentary sessions dedicated to 
monetary policy analysis. The targeted inflation is explicitly stated and 
the reasons why it was or was not hit are properly explained in quarterly 
inflation reports. In the latter case the monetary authority is also in 
charge of explaining the future steps to correct the deviations. Moreover, 
the central bank organizes with quarterly frequency press conferences 
with the participation of the governor of the bank and other staff 
members, who give insights to current macroeconomic conditions and 
prospects of the external environment. 
The policy pursued by the NBM puts a strong emphasis on convincing the public 
that inflation is the main objective of the monetary actions and not other 
nominal variable. However, foreign exchange (FX) interventions have been 
quite common practice by the bank especially during the recent crisis as they 
were considered to be more effective in achieving the trade-off between 
inflation and output. It is worth mentioning that in case of the Czech National 
Bank FX interventions, this outcome was found significant only within short-
term horizon (Gersl and Holub, 2006). What is more important; the authors 
consider that it may come at a price of undermining central bank credibility in 
case of potential inconsistency of intervention with IT framework. 
Even though there is much space left for improvement, the NBM has 
achieved important accomplishments relatively in a short time span starting to 
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build good reputation and gain credibility from the public, which is one of the 
main requirements for successful IT implementation 
Next we will quantify the NBM framework into a web chart in order to 
have a better understanding of its current state of functioning. We select several 
criteria proposed by Smidkova and Tuma (1999) applied at analyzing the main 
institutional players: Federal Reserve System, European Central Bank, 
Bundesbank and Bank of England. The qualitative information we have on the 
NBM is quantified into numbers in a way that the higher the number is the 
better it matches the criteria of effective functioning. As a benchmark we also 
include the ECB framework quantification provided by above mentioned 
authors. It must be noticed that this little evaluation represents strictly 
subjective opinion of the author formed within the analysis and may not fully 
correspond to the NBM vision.  
Figure 4.1: The NBM and benchmark frameworks  
 
Source: ECB evaluation taken from Smidkova, Tuma (1999). NBM-own evaluation based on 
presented criteria. 
1. Legal framework (4p). The NBM is an autonomous public entity 
responsible to the Parliament. Similarly to the ECB, independence is 
granted by law which also interdicts the bank to finance the debt coming 
from Government and other public institutions. 
Legal Framework  
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2. Role of Board (4p). The NBM board consists of 5 members 
independently named by the Parliament for the period of 7 years with 
the possibility of prolonging the contract. Role and responsibilities of the 
Board are established by law. The Council is responsible for the main 
operations: policy rates setting, reports approval, monetary supply, 
issuance of debt securities and licenses, determining the operational and 
structural framework of the bank. In case of our benchmark framework, 
the ECB, which is more likely a  federal system with 6 core and national 
representatives. The role of the Executive Board is limited to monetary 
policy implementation in accordance with guidelines and decisions of 
another decision making body - the General Council. Interruptible 
contracts of members of a Board valid over 8 years horizon together with 
strong position of national banks weakens core management body. 
3. Accountability (4p.). Similarly to the ECB, the NBM is directly 
accountable to the Pariament and public informing them periodically 
about main macroeconomic perspectives, the evolution of the financial 
markets, monetary supply, crediting, balance of payments and the state 
of the foreign exchange market (law on the NBM). Mishiting of the target 
and future corrections are properly explained in inflation reports and 
press releases and conferences organized by the monetary authorities. 
However, there is no specified contract for the case of errors. 
4. Minutes (2p) on basic policy decisions are published within central 
bank’s monthly press releases. They are released the same day after the 
Board meeting and contain brief and succinct information regarding 
decisions on main policy instruments as well as on premises and reasons 
that led to a particular decision. However the names and voting pattern 
is known with a delay of 6 months. Additionally quarterly press-
conferences are organized to inform the economic agents about current 
state of the main macroeconomic and financial indicators as well as 
future prospects and forecasts. Noticeably, the ECB publishes neither 
 
 
4. Inflation Targeting in Moldova                                                                                                   41 
 
minutes nor voting patterns, divulging information concerned only with 
the staff’ forecasts. 
5. Clear rules (2p.). Although the aimed level of infaltion is explicitly 
stated each period, the rules of the game are not always obvious, being 
distorted by resistance of the NBM to allow more exchange rate 
flexibility thus sending unclear signals about policy intentions to the 
market (Gigineishvili, 2007), which cannot derive implicitly the target 
from the knowledge of the economy and published forecasts. Monetary 
transmission mechanism is also subject to uncertainty and opaqueness. 
However, we see the NBM rules of the games more clear in comparison 
with the ECB dual strategy (inflation and money). 
6. Documents (1.5p) that are periodically published by Moldavian 
monetary authority exhibit high attention to explanatory part of the 
main strategy and performed actions but stress to a lesser extent 
technical details, which introduces some degree of uncertainty about 
their trustworthiness. Even though, released information reveals 
forecasts of the main macroeconomic indicators, when compared with 
the ECB high quality forward-looking documents, we assess a strong 
need for further improvement in the quality of presentation of the 
relevant information by the NBM. 
As can be noticed from the figure above, the analyzed monetary regime 
encounters problems in technical aspects rather than in institutional ones. 
Given the fact that the policy aims to fix inflation expectations it is of great 
importance to have a developed infrastructure and attract competent specialists 
able to perform efficient forecasting and analysis of future developments of the 
economy capturing the specifics of monetary policy transmission. Therefore, the 
NBM should focus on fixing the issues of accountability and transparency and 
generate some actions aimed at building reputation and improving monetary 







Analysis of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism of 
the Moldavian Economy 
5.1 Theoretical Approach to Monetary Policy Transmission 
As it was already stated in IT framework monetary authorities affect prices by 
changing policy interest rates. But how exactly these changes in instruments 
affect the economy? The answer to this question is a very complex transmission 
process consisting of numerous stages and distinct channels that very often 
interact and reinforce each other. The theory addresses 3 visions of monetary 
transmission and namely: traditional, credit channel and supply-side view. 
Traditional view describes the impact of interest rate change on aggregate 
demand; credit channel view emphasizes the same effect on the demand and 
supply in the credit market and finally, supply-side vision stresses the reaction 
of real economy supply to modifications in policy instruments. These 
interactions with the economic variables are done through 4 basic transmission 
mechanisms that are described below in more detail selected from Mishkin 
(1995). 
 Interest rate channel describes a direct influence of nominal rates on real 
rates considering price rigidities in small time horizon. Therefore a 
monetary policy contraction will have a consequence of reducing private 
consumption and investment due to interest rate pass-through to 
lending rates with changes in present value of consumption and higher 
costs of credit. Moreover it can affect the risk of asymmetric information 
together with high moral hazard and big probability of adverse selection 
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and result in lowering of the overall supply of credits. Altogether it will 
directly influence the aggregate output, the impact being more 
prominent in bank dependent economies with embryonic capital 
markets and no alternative source of financing, which is the case of 
developing markets.  
 Asset-price channel reinforces interest rate channel especially in 
countries with developed capital markets. Hence expansionary monetary 
policy can lead to increase in asset prices and balance sheet 
restructuring. Furthermore, banks will offer cheap credits, firms will 
increase investments and households will raise consumption which will 
positively alter the output. At the same time economic agents will seek to 
decrease the surplus of liquidity by investing it in equity and bonds 
inducing their prices to raise further, which potentially may create price 
bubbles. The latter situation will require prompt actions from the 
monetary authority. 
 The exchange rate channel is argued to be of greater importance for 
economies in transition than for industrialized countries due to smaller 
dimensions and larger openness of the former, which have a big share of 
imported goods (Campa, Goldberg, 2002). Hence, monetary contraction 
is followed by domestic currency appreciation and lower inflation. 
Meanwhile, lower exchange rate of national currency decreases net 
export affecting the output gap in the same direction and relaxes the 
pressure on prices.  
 Expectations channel is probably most visibly linked to IT framework 
since it aims at anchoring expectations. Furthermore, a sudden 
worsening of Central Bank’s credibility accompanied by increase in 
inflation expectations may result in bigger aggregate demand and higher 
output gap. As a result prices will also increase in the long run when 
output will be returning to its potential level.  
Several facts are worth mentioning. First, channels can have different relevance 
for a particular economy. While exchange rate channel play an extremely 
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important role for developing countries, asset-price channel may lack relevance 
in these economies as they usually have underdeveloped capital markets. 
Second, transmission is done with a lag, which may vary across countries. 
However, as country’s economic situation develops over time, the lengths of 
transmission also adjusts.  
Forward-looking monetary policy decisions assumed by IT framework 
stress a great importance of preliminary knowledge of the speed and the extent 
of adjustment of inflation and real economy to changes in Central Bank’s 
instruments. Therefore, analyzing monetary transmission mechanism aspect of 
Moldavian economy can help us to draw a clearer picture of the actual situation 
and elaborate on future developments. In the following sections we will try to 
answer the question, which of the available instruments used by the NBM have 
stronger effects on prices: main policy rate, required reserve ratio or exchange 
rate; and what is the speed of adjustment of the variables to simulated 
monetary shocks.  
To our best knowledge we have noticed that Moldova lacks studies 
focusing on monetary transmission analysis. One of the few authors was 
Gigineishvili (2007) who tried to examine interest rate channel of monetary 
policy propagation in Moldova by approximating the strength and speed of 
interest rate pass-through. His results were not encouraging; the NBM 
modification of the main policy rates has weak and almost ineffective 
propagation both to market and to retail rates being caused by primitive 
development of financial markets, incomplete term structure of the 
instruments, excessive liquidity pumped into the market, all these leading to 
inconsistency of policy actions with its long-term goals, distortion of the yield 
curve and to lost credibility of the monetary authority.  
Next, Gorbanyov et al. (2010) have analyzed Moldavian monetary 
transmission mechanism via VAR framework with different specifications. Their 
main findings can be resumed to: first, monetary policy instruments have 
incomplete effect on market and retail rates. Second, there is no significant 
relationship between GDP growth and main policy rate, the latter rather affects 
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private credit and prices. Finally, they came out with very persistent although 
not very significant result that currency depreciation leads to higher inflation.  
Finally, Lupusor, Babin and Popa (2012) using structural VAR estimation 
came to the conclusion that main contribution to weakening of monetary sector 
efficiency is given by such factors as domestic and foreign fluctuations of 
industrial sector. Thus a shock to industrial production index induces almost 
unitary persistent response of inflation with a delay. Also, the required reserve 
ratio is responsible for much stronger movements in inflation than main policy 
rate. However too often resorting to this policy tool is inadvisable since it 
manifests adverse shocks over the lending activity of the banking sector.  
5.2 Data Selection 
Next we will analyze transmission mechanism of the NBM monetary policy 
using Vector Autoregression (VAR) framework firstly proposed by Sims in 1980. 
It is nothing but a system of equations regressed on each other’s lag. The VAR 
framework will include the following variables in levels taken in the specified 
order: 
 Real GDP [l_gdp] will proxy economic activity. Quarterly series were log-
linearized and seasonally adjusted. In order to obtain monthly frequency 
we interpolated quarterly observations using quadratic-match average 
procedure as seen in Borys, Horvath (2008).  
 CPI index (l_cpi) quantifies general level of prices in the economy. The 
index is computed by the National Bureau of Statistics of Moldova and 
consists of: core inflation, food prices, fuel prices and regulated prices. 
We are aware that last three components can bring additional volatility 
and seasonal character to the index, however, we believe it is better 
perceived by the public who is historically used to it in forming inflation 
expectations. 
 Main policy rate (main_rate) is applied on the short term auctions of 
NBM Certificates. In addition we will estimate the impact of the required 
reserve ratio (rrr), frequently employed instrument, representing a 
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minimum amount of money a licensed bank should keep within the NBM, 
which is an express and robust measure to balance liquidity in the 
market.  
 MDL/USD nominal exchange rate of Moldavian lei against US dollar (l_er) 
taken as monthly average exchange rate set by the NBM. The 
interpretation of the rate is based on purchasing power parity theory, 
namely decreasing of the rate is interpreted as appreciation of a national 
currency.  
 We also allow for contemporaneous impact of 2 exogenous variables: 
world food index (l_food) and world energy index (l_energy) to capture 
external inflation developments, which as Peersman and Smets (2001) 
suggest can additionally control for price puzzle (i.e increase in price 
level after a monetary tightening). By treating these variables as 
exogenous we implicitly assume that Moldavian economy is too small to 
influence them.  
 For the sensitivity specification we add monthly volume of remittances 
(l_remit) transferred by Moldavian citizens from abroad as an additional 
variable that has a huge implication on defining economic evolution of 
the country, reaching almost 28% of GDP in 20088. 
The variables were selected based on economic theory and data availability 
criteria from publicly accessible national and international sources9. Even 
though it would be preferable to limit our estimation to the period starting with 
IT regime adoption (2010), the resulting sample would be too small to make 
reasonable analysis and to draw efficient conclusions. Therefore we decided to 
begin with year 2004, when all the necessary variables are available. Thus, our 
sample covers 103 observations (2004M1-2012M09) with monthly frequency 
(even though similar studies usually employ quarterly periods) to compensate 
for the small sample size. The plots of the series are available in the figure B.1, 
appendix B. All the variables except policy rates are taken in logs.  
                                                        
8 National Bank of Moldova database 
9 National Bank of Moldova database, National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, 
UNECE statistical database, World Bank database. 
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Before proceeding with the analysis we check series for cointegration by 
applying Johansen test (see table 5.1). Its test statistics indicates presence of 
potential cointegration at 95 percent confidence level.  
Table 5.1: Johansen trace test for cointegration 
     
     Hypothesized 




Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None * 0.40 93.15 47.85 0.00 
At most 1 * 0.24 39.81 29.79 0.00 
At most 2 0.09 10.50 15.49 0.24 
At most 3 0.00 0.79 3.84 0.37 
     
     Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
 
This issue can be solved by using VEC (Vector Error Correction) or VAR in 
levels. Since VEC proved to contain unit root, we will proceed with modeling 
VAR in levels allowing in this case for possible cointegration of the series. 
5.3 Model Specification 
This subsection will present general notes on VAR framework adopted for the 
monetary shocks analysis on Moldavian economy. Generally, the reduced form 
of the model is: 
( ) ( )t t p t tX A L X B L Y u   ,                                                                                            (11) 
where Xt and Yt are endogenous and exogenous vectors of variables, 
respectively. For our basic specification: Xt’=[l_gdpt, l_cpit, main_ratet and l_ert] 
and Yt’=[l_foodt and l_oilt], ut is a vector of reduced-form error terms which can 
be contemporaneously correlated. Hence, the vector of structural disturbances 
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                                                                 (12) 
Model (11) can be estimated equation by equation using simple OLS. In order to 
recover the shocks we use a standard Choleski identification scheme where 
selected ordering plays vital importance. The ongoing hypothesis is that shocks 
to other variables can have only lagged and not contemporaneous effect on GDP. 
Prices are immediately affected only by output changes and policy rate shock is 
not reflected contemporaneously in output and prices but may influence 
exchage rate straightaway. The latter is influenced promptly by all the variables 
specified earlier. The choice and ordering of the variables is motivated by 
economic theory. Usually variables are ordered in the following way: GDP, 
prices, interest rate and other variables (exchange rate). 
As an additional sensitivity analysis we employ alternative non-recursive 
structural VAR (SVAR) identification scheme. In this model we include a new 
variable - volume of remittances (foreign personal transfers) that is rather 
exogenous and not affected by other variables. We also allow for 
contemporaneous correlation between interest rate and prices, assuming that 
policy makers at the time of reaching the decision are not informed about the 
current volume of remittances and level of output. Actual level of output is 
affected by the volume of personal foreign transfers; prices are influenced both 
by the remittances and GDP. Exchange rate is assumed to absorb all the shocks 
at the same time. In the above described specification matrices A and B will 
contain following restrictions10: 
                                                        
10 Being consistent with previous notation reduced form residuals (ut) from equation (11) 
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Re Re1 0 0 0 0
* 1 0 0 0
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5.4 Estimation Results 
In this section we outline our main findings on the monetary transmission 
mechanism of Moldavian economy. The optimal number of lags included in the 
system was selected counting on information criteria (see table B.1, appendix 
B). The majority of the analyzed criteria suggest using 2 lags, which is also 
convenient for us when relying on the parsimony of the model. 
The stability of the whole system is a key assumption, even if some of 
individual series are not stationary, since differencing may lead to losing 
important information about long run co-movements between variables. When 
computing our VAR set-up inverse roots relation to unit circle, all eigenvalues 
were smaller than one in absolute value (table B.2, appendix B) that confirms 
stability of the applied model. The baseline model estimation output is 
presented in appendix B (see table B.3).  
Next we present the results of impulse response functions (IRF) 
describing the effect of unexpected changes to main policy rates in order to 
seize the current state and speed of policy transmission adjustment to the 
economy. The figure below represents impulse responses and corresponding 
confidence intervals of endogenous variables reaction to unexpected tightening 
of policy rate. The size of the shock is measured as standard deviation shock to 
structural error term. 
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Figure 5.1: Estimated impulse response functions to monetary policy shock 
 
The response of economic activity to monetary tightening seems to correspond 
to economic theory where increase in interest rates induces negative impact on 
aggregate demand. In our model output gradually falls reaching its bottom (-
0.2%) after 10 months and the shock dies away in 2 years. Peersman and Smets 
(2001) obtain quite similar results for the euro area IR-GDP pass-through (real 
output reaches bottom point of -15 basis points in 3-4 quarters) in analogue 
model specification. However, we have to mention that confidence intervals are 
wide, which induces uncertainty in overall interpretation. 
Reaction of price levels to 0.55 p.p. positive shock in policy rate turned 
out to be opposite from the traditional view, thus exhibiting the "price puzzle", 
although having rather low significance for longer time lags. Inflation index 
sharply rises by 1.1 p.p in 5 month interval and then slowly decreases. The price 
puzzle has different explanations in economic literature. Rusnak et al. (2011) 
and Hanson (2004) assigns it to improper estimation technique and model 
misspecification in case when VAR series include periods of switches of 
monetary regime. We are aware that this critique is valid for our sample, 
however, Moldova experiences the path of IT only for 2 years and the lack of 
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historically available data makes it difficult to assess the IR –prices pass-
through more effectively on shorter sample. Another authors, Barth and Ramey 
(2004) stress that it happens in the economies where dominance of cost 
channel in transmission is present, since an increase in interest rates gives rise 
to production costs that directly contribute to higher inflation. The latter can 
certainly be the case for Moldova where interest rate influence on production 
costs is responsible for almost 50 percent of deviations in inflation in the 
medium term as seen in Lupusor, Babin and Popa (2012). 
Next we observe that monetary policy innovations are firstly 
accompanied by slight and statistically-insignificant short-term (2 months) 
depreciation of the currency followed by persistent and significant appreciation 
of the national currency, lasting for the next 8 quarters and reaching the 
maximum change of 91 basis points at the same time as output falls to its 
bottom level after 10 months. The exchange rate reaction is not fully in line with 
uncovered interest rate parity hypothesis that predicts an immediate jump 
appreciation followed by a gradual depreciation of the currency as a result of 
monetary tightening as was the case observed in Czech monetary transmission 
(Borys, Horvath, 2008). 
Below we present the recursive VAR specification where we replace 
main policy rate with more extreme measure frequently used by the NBM – 
required reserve ratio. The model does not include exogenous variables. 
Notably in our alternative specification, one Cholesky standard deviation 
translates into almost unitary shock of the monetary instrument. Patters 
reported in the graph with prices are broadly in line with economic theory - 
after the 5th month prices start to fall gradually. Nevertheless, relatively wide 
confidence intervals and the fact that the pressure does not die away diverging 
in time generates motives to questioning the reliability of the findings. 
Aggregate demand has the same although more delayed reaction when 
pressures to required reserve ratio are intensified. In terms of exchange rate 
response to pressure from this alternative policy instrument, we do observe 
only appreciation within framed intervals, which reveals no signs of exchange 
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rate puzzle in Moldavian economy. However, it has to be pointed out that we 
may not fully trust the results as confidence bands are relatively wide for all the 
cases. 
Figure 5.2: Estimated impulse response functions to RRR shock 
 
When it comes to ER shocks (figure B.2, appendix B) it practically generates no 
response of the main variables except of initial increase of output in 3 months. 
In addition confidence intervals are too wide. These results do not correspond 
to Corricelli (2006) logic about the high exchange rate-prices pass-through in 
emerging economies due to their high openness. In fact it rather signals about 
exchange rate channel weakness in Moldova.  
The alternative SVAR specification incorporating remittances, output, 
prices, policy rate and exchange rate variables generates similar impulse 
responses (figure B.3, appendix B) to contractionary monetary shock as in our 
baseline model. Notably, aggregate output increases in the first quarter and then 
continuously decreases. Prices positive reaction became significant for the first 
4 month after the shock, which is a sign of the presence of price puzzle in 
national economy. For the reasons discussed earlier it may serve as an 
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argument of inefficient functioning of transmission mechanism when monetary 
policy is not implemented in a way to fully offset inflationary supply shocks 
(Balke and Emery, 1994). Exchange rate behavior conforms to recursive VAR 
model findings, except there is no period of depreciation; national currency 
rather appreciates within 2 years after monetary policy tightening. Moreover 
the bottom level is deeper in SVAR specification, reaching a significant reduction 
by 116 basis points in 8 months. Unless otherwise stated the significance of 
variables’ reaction did not improve considerably.  
Further, we portray the relative importance of factors affecting prices and 
policy instrument by using forecast error variance decomposition. 
Figure 5.3: Forecast error variance decomposition of prices 
 
Note: VAR recursive specification with main rate (left) and required reseerve ration (right) as 
policy instruments. 
In the left picture we can observe that main contribution (90%) to inflation 
shocks is given by its own lagged values throughout all analyzed period. Main 
policy rate exhibits weak influence on prices, reaching the maximum effect of 
almost 4% in half a year period. One possible explanation can be that public is 
rather backward-looking in forming inflation expectations and does not fully 
trust monetary authorities’ inflation forecasts. The latter is a common 
phenomena in transitional countries, which are subject to various structural 
modifications and high uncertainty in economic develoment.  
In case of the graph from the right side, where required reserve serve as 







1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 







1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 
L_GDP L_CPI RRR L_ER 
 
 
5.Analysis of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism of the Moldavian Economy        54 
 
variables have its own contribution to inflation movements. Output shocks 
exercise increasing pressure on inflation throughout observed period being 
responsible for maximum 17.5 % of movements in prices. Alternatve policy tool 
measure exhibits more power on prices incorporating 18% of CPI movements 
after 2 years. Exchange rate shows its apparition in 1 year horizon reaching the 
proportion of 2.5% from overall factors affecting inflation suggesting again poor 
influence of this variable. 
The graph below depicts structural decomposition of the prices coming 
from alternative non-recursive identification scheme. 
Figure 5.4: Forecast error variance decomposition of prices (SVAR specification) 
 
The dominant role in shaping inflation remains to be its own lagged values 
although in this case it diminishes to 40 % after 2 years. A rising contribution is 
given by volume of foreign personal transfers that evolves in time and 
determines up to 36% of price movements in 24 months. Monetary policy rate 
continues to have a symbolic weight of almost 4,5%. Aggregate output and 
exchange rate exert maximum influence (14, 5% and 5,6 % respectively) after 

























Concluding Remarks and Recommendations  
The second part of the present work was at attempt to evaluate preliminary 
experience of a developing country choosing to adopt inflation targeting regime. 
We analyse initial framework of the NBM at the time of IT adoption, first 
realizations of the regime as well as monetary transmission mechanism within a 
period of the last 9 years. 
Inflation targeting was adopted by the NBM after abandoning managed 
exchange rate floating. Initial preconditions of central bank independence and 
primacy of inflation objective stressed by Masson et al. (1997) were partially 
satisfied long before the idea of changing the regime. Therefore, choosing IT 
came out to be the best available choice. New framework came together with 
the reforms in the policy conduct and in the banking system. The latter was 
mainly addressed to protect private depositors being motivated by the recent 
economic turndown. As for the policy administration, monetary authority has 
begun to enhance its accountability to the Parliament and economic agents and 
has tried to maintain a high degree of transparency of its actions by diversifying 
the means of communication with the public as well as increasing messages’ 
frequency. These actions contributed to lowering inflation and its expectations 
to moderate single digit levels and to building good reputation. However, the 
NBM desire to match multiple and sometimes opposing objectives of low 
inflation and exchange rate stability has driven to partially sterilized FX 
interventions and liquidity overhang (Gigineishvili, 2007). Besides sending of 
sometimes confusing signals to the public, policy effectiveness is undermined by 
the problems of technical nature related to developing of effective forecasting 
capabilities and good understanding of monetary policy transmission. 
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Further, being motivated by the lack of available studies focusing on monetary 
transmission in Moldova, we wanted to make our own contribution to this field. 
By using an up-to-date sample, alternative specifications (recursive and 
structural VAR) and different variables (inclusion of remittances in the system) 
we develop a VAR framework for the Moldavian economy.  
The empirical evidence leads us to conclusion that rate on weekly 
auctions on NBM certificates failed it role of a correct monetary transmission 
tool since its unexpected surprises generate the price puzzle. This contrintuitive 
result was observed in both recursive and structural specifications of the model. 
We believe that the most plausible explanation of such a response of prices 
remains to be the idea of inadequacy of interest rate channel in monetary policy 
transmission, induced by low degree of development of financial markets that 
interrupts the connection between interest rates and other market instruments 
(Cechetti, 1999). Moreover prevalence of non-monetary factors in shaping the 
output (production cost channel) creates additional pressure on inflation. One 
might also argue that price anomaly may arise because of model 
misspecification coming from including in the analysis the periods with 
monetary regime switches. However lack of historical data did not allow us to 
exclude them from our model. As time passes we recommend to apply the 
model exclusively on a sample covering implicit IT period in order to obtain 
more efficient results. The responses of real GDP and exchange rate to monetary 
surprises conform traditional economic literature view. Both variables decrease 
and reach its bottom points after 10 months. 
Alternatively we confirmed existing results that reserve requirements 
have much stronger and faster effect on both prices and output, which is not 
surprising since it was in a past the frequent instrument used by the NBM to 
control liquidity in the market. However as Lupusor et al. (2012) claim it may 
have side effects on banking system in case central bank resorts to it too often, 
putting pressure on credit performance. 
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Our empirical estimation surprisingly suggests that exchange rate is not 
anymore a relevant channel for the Moldavian economy. Its shock practically 
generates no significant movements of the nominal and real variables.  
When it comes to inflation shocks composition we found that it mainly 
depends on its own past values reflecting the backward-looking orientation of 
the public in forming their expectations. Another important component 
responsible for almost 36% of price shocks in 2 years turned out to be the 
volume of remittances transferred by Moldavian citizens from abroad. Whereas 
interest rate channel importance reaches almost 5%. 
The main recommendations can be summed up in the following actions: 
 Solving technical problems by attracting competent specialists who can 
develop and implement an efficient forecasting model of the economy, 
explain it clearly to the agents and educate them to form their 
expectations in forward manner by trusting bank’s forecasts; 
 Improve understanding of inflation sources within a thorough monetary 
transmission analysis; 
 Increase the effectiveness of interest rate channel by improving market 
infrastructure and strenghening the link between policy, market and 
retail interest rates (Gigineishvili, 2007); 
 Renounce to the practice of frequent FX interventions and maintain 
consistency of policy actions with inflation objective; 
 Increase the quality of reported documents; 
 More clear rules and further improvement of accountability and 
transparency. 
Even though there is much space left for improvement of the inflation targeting 
skills, we believe that NBM chose the right time for regime adoption. As argued 
by Batini and Laxton (2006) IT abilities can be developed over time and regime 
introduction creates pressure to do it quickly. The latter is consolidated by the 
NBM experience that has already undertaken big steps and is making first 
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Table A.1: Sample of countries delimited by region and IT framework 
1) CEE 






2) Latin America and Caribbean 
Inflation Targeters                                          Control Group 
Brazil Argentina 
Guatemala Costa Rica 
Mexico Dominican Rep. 
Chile Ecuador 
Colombia El Salvador 
Peru Jamaica 
 Trinidad and Tobago 















3) Sub-Saharnan Africa 
Inflation Targeters                                          Control Group 
Ghana Angola 
South Africa Botswana 
 Cameroon 






4) Developing Asia 




 Pakistan  
















                                                        
11 Countries are included in robustness analysis. 
 
 
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics of the variables 
 CPI (y-o-y change) Inflation volatility 
(detrended series) 
Mean 10.75 2.94 
Median 6.23 1.51 
Minimum -8.24 0.11 
Maximum 325.03 96.32 
C.V. 2.13 2.31 
Std. Deviation 22.91 6.81 
Skewness 8.34 8.67 
Ex. kurtosis 88.15 93.04 
 
Figure A.1: Inflation evolution by country 
 
Note: Angola was excluded because of graphical representation consistency. 




Table A.3: Means and Standard Deviations of the analysed sample 
















Angola 93.88 101.40   
Argentina 7.09 7.20   
Bangladesh 6.36 2.50   
Botswana 8.39 1.73   
Brazil 5.06 2.63 6.57 2.79 
Bulgaria 6.79 4.51   
Cameroon 2.81 1.83   
Chile 5.62 0.72 3.30 1.91 
China 1.87 2.38   
Colombia 18.57 0.14 6.09 2.38 
Costa Rica 10.30 2.66   
Croatia 3.29 1.59   
Cóte d'Ivoire 3.07 2.05   
Dominican R. 11.01 12.60   
Ecuador 20.34 26.44   
El Salvador 3.18 1.84   
Ethiopia 10.60 13.73   
Ghana 19.39 7.58 13.18 4.46 
Guatemala 6.95 1.36 6.54 3.13 
Hungary 13.07 4.03 5.47 1.83 
India 6.77 3.23   
Indonesia 15.61 17.94 7.9 3.22 
Jamaica 10.31 4.12   
Kenya 8.51 3.87   
Latvia 5.05 3.99   
Malaysia 2.50 1.43   
Mexico 15.64 4.59 4.56 0.86 
Nigeria 11.53 4.03   
Pakistan 8.02 4.31   
Panama 2.46 2.34   
Peru 5.00 2.77 2.51 1.52 
Phillipinnes 6.62 1.59 4.57 1.82 
Poland 14.9  4.35 3.30 
Romania 48.68 45.87 6.53 1.43 
South Africa 6.89 1.71 5.88 2.65 
Sri Lanka 9.81 4.77   
Tanzania 8.09 3.79   
Thailand 4.64 3.94 2.63 1.81 
Trinidad and T. 6.07 2.66   
Turkey 47.97 29.15 8.34 1.67 
 
 
Uruguay 9.12 4.93   
Venezuela 24.89 9.73   
Vietnam 7.36 6.44   
TOTAL 12.40 25.92 5.39 3.14 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data selected from IMF WEO.    















Figure A.2: Inflation Volatility for the Selected Sample 
 
 
Table A.4: Estimates of Inflation Targeting on Inflation and Inflation Volatility 
during the crisis period 
2.A Dependent variable: CPI inflation (y-o-y change) 













































AR(1)test    0,23 0,20 0,10 
AR(2)test    0,41 0,35 0,34 
Hansen J t.    0,15 0,35 0,51 
Diff-in-
Hansen 
    0,99 1,00 
Instrum.    16 24 25 
Observ. 171 171 171 128 171 171 
R2 0,73 0,73 0,71    














































AR(1)test    0,15 0,13 0,18 
AR(2)test    0,19 0,16 0,19 
Hansen J t.    0,58 0,93 0,89 
Diff-in-
Hansen 
    0,97 0,69 
Instrum.    16 24 25 
Observ. 171 171 171 128 171 171 
R2 0,51 0,52 0,49    
Note: * statistically significant at 10% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, *** 
statistically significant at 1% level. CPI inflation is transformed: yi,t = 100*ln(1+CPIi,t/100)and 
summed over 3 years. Inflation volatility is proxied by standard deviation of HP detrended CPI 
over 3 years. Column (1) includes pooled cross-sections OLS, in (2) time-fixed effect (TE-OLS) 
and country fixed-effect (CTE-OLS) with robust standard errors clustered by country in 
paranthesis. Column (4) presents two-step Arrelano-Bond difference GMM estimator. Next 2 
columns make use of two-step system-GMM estimator which takes inflation targeting dummy as 
predetermined (5) and as endogenous variables (6). Two-step robust standard errors corrected 
for finite sample are presented in paranthesis. AR(1), AR(2), Hansen J test and Difference-in-





Table A.5: Robustness check. Sensitivity to different subsamples. Dependent variable: CPI inflation (y-o-y change). 
 Expanding the sample 
(+CIS countries) 
Excluding CEE group of 
countries 
Excluding Asian group of 
countries 
Excluding African group 
of countries 
 S-GMM(p) S-GMM(e) S-GMM(p) S-GMM(e) S-GMM (p) S-GMM(e) S-GMM(p) S-GMM(e) 




















































AR(1) 0,10 0,02 0,19 0,11 0,13 0,08 0,17 0,09 
AR(2) 0,42 0,41 0,39 0,36 0,32 0,33 0,33 0,38 
Hansen J test 0,44 0,62 0,41 0,68 0,67 0,90 0,55 0,42 
Difference-in-
Hansen 
0,80 0,77 0,71 0,19 0,69 1,00 1,00 0,97 
Instruments 34 34 31 30 34 33 32 30 
Observations 191 191 144 144 131 131 131 131 
Note: * statistically significant at 10% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% level. Inflation is transformed: yi,t = 
100*ln(1+CPIi,t/100)and summed over 3 years.Two-step system-GMM estimator which takes inflation targeting dummy as predetermined (S-GMM 
(p)) and as endogenous variables (S-GMM(e)); robust standard errors presented in paranthesis. AR(1), AR(2), Hansen J test and Difference-in-Hansen 






Table A.6: GMM estimators for crisis period with both IT and IT*crisis 


































































AR(1) 0,20 0,19 0,09 0,14 0,13 0,18 
AR(2) 0,43 0,35 0,33 0,20 0,16 0,19 
Hansen J test 0,17 0,50 0,66 0,56 0,96 0,98 
Difference-in-
Hansen test 
0,04 0,99 0,98 0,37 0,81 0,91 
Instruments 128 171 171 128 171 171 
Observations 24 35 34 24 35 34 
Note: * statistically significant at 10% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% level. Inflation is transformed: yi,t = 
100*ln(1+CPIi,t/100)and summed over 3 years.Two-step system-GMM estimator which takes IT as predetermined (S-GMM (p)) and as endogenous 
variables (S-GMM(e)); IT*crisis variable is considered endogenously detemined in the system; robust standard errors presented in paranthesis. AR(1), 




Table A.7: Robustness Check. Estimates of Inflation Targeting on Inflation 
Volatility 













































AR(1)test    0,14 0,10 0,09 
AR(2)test    0,45 0,76 0,55 
Hansen J test    0,26 0,76 0,86 
Difference-in-
Hansen 
    0,94 0,77 
Instruments    24 34 33 
Observations 171 171 171 128 171 171 
R-squared 0,58 0,58 0,54    
Note: * statistically significant at 10% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, *** 
statistically significant at 1% level. Inflation volatility is proxied by standard deviation of CPI 
over 3 years. Column (1) includes pooled cross-sections OLS, in (2) time-fixed effect (TE-OLS) and 
country fixed-effect (CTE-OLS) with robust standard errors clustered by country in paranthesis. 
Column (4) presents two-step Arrelano-Bond difference GMM estimator. Next 2 columns make use of 
two-step system-GMM estimator which takes inflation targeting dummy as predetermined (5) and as 
endogenous variables (6); robust standard errors presented in paranthesis. AR(1), AR(2), Hansen J test 






















Table B.1: Information Criteria on number of lags included in the model 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria   
Exogenous variables: C  L_FOOD L_ENERGY   
Sample: 2004M01 2012M09     
Included observations: 97     
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE       AIC      SC           HQ 
       
       0 60.42243 NA  4.33e-06 -0.998401 -0.679880 -0.869606 
1 671.1873 1133.378 2.05e-11 -13.26159  -12.51838* -12.96107 
2 706.5876  62.77180 1.38e-11*  -13.66160* -12.49369  -13.18936* 
3 721.4654 25.15420 1.42e-11 -13.63846 -12.04586 -12.99449 
4 729.2781 12.56477 1.70e-11 -13.46965 -11.45235 -12.65396 
5 739.3483 15.36481 1.95e-11 -13.34739 -10.90539 -12.35997 
6 759.3165 28.82004 1.84e-11 -13.42921 -10.56252 -12.27006 
7 779.5729 27.56536 1.74e-11 -13.51697 -10.22558 -12.18609 
8 801.1989  27.64572* 1.62e-11 -13.63297 -9.916890 -12.13037 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
 FPE: Final prediction error  
 AIC: Akaike information criterion  
 SC: Schwarz information criterion  
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion  
 
Table B.2: VAR stability condition check 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: L_GDP L_CPI MAIN_RATE L_ER  
Exogenous variables: C  L_FOOD L_ENERGY  
Lag specification: 1 2 
  
       Root Modulus 
  
   0.989337  0.989337 
 0.856209 - 0.084337i  0.860352 
 0.856209 + 0.084337i  0.860352 
 0.710424  0.710424 
 0.416523 - 0.244330i  0.482897 
 0.416523 + 0.244330i  0.482897 
 0.386739  0.386739 
 0.092770  0.092770 
  
   No root lies outside the unit circle. 




Table B.3: VAR baseline specification output 
 Sample (adjusted): 2004M03 2012M09  
 Included observations: 103 after adjustments  
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]  
     
      L_GDP L_CPI MAIN_RATE L_ER 
     
     L_GDP(-1) 0.964693 0.016455 -4.602445 0.004379 
 (0.11276) (0.15791) (3.76419) (0.09354) 
 [ 8.55525] [ 0.10421] [-1.22269] [ 0.04681] 
     
L_GDP(-2) -0.271766 0.079933 1.592978 0.060497 
 (0.10738) (0.15038) (3.58474) (0.08908) 
 [-2.53077] [ 0.53154] [ 0.44438] [ 0.67910] 
     
L_CPI(-1) 0.089059 1.532788 5.599029 0.048059 
 (0.06402) (0.08966) (2.13719) (0.05311) 
 [ 1.39108] [ 17.0965] [ 2.61981] [ 0.90487] 
     
L_CPI(-2) -0.078255 -0.544192 -5.914697 -0.050390 
 (0.06363) (0.08911) (2.12409) (0.05279) 
 [-1.22986] [-6.10727] [-2.78458] [-0.95461] 
     
MAIN_RATE(-1) -3.28E-05 0.009502 1.142785 0.000949 
 (0.00306) (0.00429) (0.10218) (0.00254) 
 [-0.01071] [ 2.21693] [ 11.1845] [ 0.37375] 
     
MAIN_RATE(-2) -0.000539 -0.009611 -0.208706 -0.004082 
 (0.00304) (0.00425) (0.10141) (0.00252) 
 [-0.17728] [-2.25931] [-2.05809] [-1.61985] 
     
L_ER(-1) 0.147478 -0.039341 -0.293942 1.084468 
 (0.11884) (0.16643) (3.96728) (0.09859) 
 [ 1.24094] [-0.23638] [-0.07409] [ 10.9996] 
     
L_ER(-2) -0.121023 0.030227 0.690061 -0.249077 
 (0.11025) (0.15439) (3.68028) (0.09146) 
 [-1.09775] [ 0.19579] [ 0.18750] [-2.72338] 
     
C 2.497781 -0.766543 17.55737 0.190084 
 (0.58124) (0.81395) (19.4029) (0.48218) 
 [ 4.29736] [-0.94175] [ 0.90488] [ 0.39421] 
     
L_FOOD 0.002847 -0.029120 1.818743 -0.078986 
 (0.02599) (0.03639) (0.86753) (0.02156) 
 [ 0.10956] [-0.80016] [ 2.09647] [-3.66373] 
     
L_ENERGY 0.037684 0.030060 0.619690 0.011544 
 (0.01321) (0.01850) (0.44099) (0.01096) 
 [ 2.85258] [ 1.62489] [ 1.40522] [ 1.05339] 
     
     R-squared 0.967121 0.999732 0.982390 0.968231 
Adj. R-squared 0.963547 0.999703 0.980475 0.964778 
Sum sq. resids 0.025662 0.050325 28.59706 0.017661 
S.E. equation 0.016701 0.023388 0.557528 0.013855 
F-statistic 270.6100 34305.01 513.2156 280.3947 
Log likelihood 281.1692 246.4841 -80.15727 300.4127 
Akaike AIC -5.246004 -4.572507 1.770044 -5.619664 
 
 
Schwarz SC -4.964625 -4.291128 2.051423 -5.338286 
Mean dependent 9.231644 7.267713 11.27670 2.479116 
S.D. dependent 0.087475 1.356551 3.990017 0.073826 
     
     Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 8.54E-12   
Determinant resid covariance 5.44E-12   
Log likelihood 751.2115   
Akaike information criterion -13.73226   
Schwarz criterion -12.60675   
     



















Figure B.3: SVAR impulse responses to monetary tightening 
 
 Note: Shock 4=shock to monetary policy rate 
 
 
 
 
